Michael Backes - researchr alias

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2011

2010

Brief announcement: anonymity and trust in distributed systemsMichael Backes, Stefan Lorenz, Matteo Maffei, Kim Pecina. podc 2010: 237-238 [doi]

Speaker Recognition in Encrypted Voice StreamsMichael Backes, Goran Doychev, Markus Dürmuth, Boris Köpf. esorics 2010: 508-523 [doi]

Computational soundness of symbolic zero-knowledge proofsMichael Backes, Dominique Unruh. jcs, 18(6):1077-1155, 2010. [doi]

Anonymous Webs of TrustMichael Backes, Stefan Lorenz, Matteo Maffei, Kim Pecina. pet 2010: 130-148 [doi]

Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on PrintersMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Sebastian Gerling, Manfred Pinkal, Caroline Sporleder. uss 2010: 307-322 [doi]

Computationally Sound Abstraction and Verification of Secure Multi-Party ComputationsMichael Backes, Matteo Maffei, Esfandiar Mohammadi. fsttcs 2010: 352-363 [doi]

Computationally sound verification of source codeMichael Backes, Matteo Maffei, Dominique Unruh. ccs 2010: 387-398 [doi]

RatFish: A File Sharing Protocol Provably Secure against Rational UsersMichael Backes, Oana Ciobotaru, Anton Krohmer. esorics 2010: 607-625 [doi]

2009

CSAR: A Practical and Provable Technique to Make Randomized Systems AccountableMichael Backes, Peter Druschel, Andreas Haeberlen, Dominique Unruh. ndss 2009: [doi]

CoSP: a general framework for computational soundness proofsMichael Backes, Dennis Hofheinz, Dominique Unruh. ccs 2009: 66-78 [doi]

Anonymity and Censorship Resistance in Unstructured Overlay NetworksMichael Backes, Marek Hamerlik, Alessandro Linari, Matteo Maffei, Christos Tryfonopoulos, Gerhard Weikum. otm 2009: 147-164 [doi]

Automatic Discovery and Quantification of Information LeaksMichael Backes, Boris KÃ¶pf, Andrey Rybalchenko. sp 2009: 141-153 [doi]

Tempest in a Teapot: Compromising Reflections RevisitedMichael Backes, Tongbo Chen, Markus DÃ¼rmuth, Hendrik P. A. Lensch, Martin Welk. sp 2009: 315-327 [doi]

Computer Security - ESORICS 2009, 14th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Saint-Malo, France, September 21-23, 2009. ProceedingsMichael Backes, Peng Ning, editors, Volume 5789 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2009. [doi]

Achieving Security Despite Compromise Using Zero-knowledgeMichael Backes, Martin P. Grochulla, Catalin Hritcu, Matteo Maffei. csfw 2009: 308-323 [doi]

2008

Anonymous and censorship resistant content sharing in unstructured overlaysMichael Backes, Marek Hamerlik, Alessandro Linari, Matteo Maffei, Christos Tryfonopoulos, Gerhard Weikum. podc 2008: 429 [doi]

A Formal Language for Cryptographic PseudocodeMichael Backes, Matthias Berg, Dominique Unruh. lpar 2008: 353-376 [doi]

OAEP Is Secure under Key-Dependent MessagesMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Dominique Unruh. asiacrypt 2008: 506-523 [doi]

Formally Bounding the Side-Channel Leakage in Unknown-Message AttacksMichael Backes, Boris Köpf. esorics 2008: 517-532 [doi]

Computational Soundness of Symbolic Zero-Knowledge Proofs Against Active AttackersMichael Backes, Dominique Unruh. csfw 2008: 255-269 [doi]

Conditional reactive simulatabilityMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Dennis Hofheinz, Ralf Küsters. ijisec, 7(2):155-169, 2008. [doi]

Limits of the BRSIM/UC soundness of Dolev-Yao-style XORMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. ijisec, 7(1):33-54, 2008. [doi]

Compromising Reflections-or-How to Read LCD Monitors around the CornerMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Dominique Unruh. sp 2008: 158-169 [doi]

Type-checking zero-knowledgeMichael Backes, Catalin Hritcu, Matteo Maffei. ccs 2008: 357-370 [doi]

Key-dependent message security under active attacks - BRSIM/UC-soundness of Dolev-Yao-style encryption with key cyclesMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Andre Scedrov. jcs, 16(5):497-530, 2008. [doi]

Limits of Constructive Security ProofsMichael Backes, Dominique Unruh. asiacrypt 2008: 290-307 [doi]

Automated Verification of Remote Electronic Voting Protocols in the Applied Pi-CalculusMichael Backes, Catalin Hritcu, Matteo Maffei. csfw 2008: 195-209 [doi]

Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation ProtocolMichael Backes, Matteo Maffei, Dominique Unruh. sp 2008: 202-215 [doi]

The CASPA Tool: Causality-Based Abstraction for Security Protocol AnalysisMichael Backes, Stefan Lorenz, Matteo Maffei, Kim Pecina. cav 2008: 419-422 [doi]

2007

On the Necessity of Rewinding in Secure Multiparty ComputationMichael Backes, Jörn Müller-Quade, Dominique Unruh. tcc 2007: 157-173 [doi]

PrefaceMichael Backes, Stefanos Gritzalis, Bart Preneel. ijisec, 6(6):359-360, 2007. [doi]

A calculus of challenges and responsesMichael Backes, Agostino Cortesi, Riccardo Focardi, Matteo Maffei. ccs 2007: 51-60 [doi]

PrefaceMichael Backes, David A. Basin, Michael Waidner. jcs, 15(6):561, 2007. [doi]

PrefaceMichael Backes, Andre Scedrov. ENTCS, 180(1):1-2, 2007. [doi]

On Simulatability Soundness and Mapping Soundness of Symbolic CryptographyMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Ralf Küsters. fsttcs 2007: 108-120 [doi]

The reactive simulatability (RSIM) framework for asynchronous systemsMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. iandc, 205(12):1685-1720, 2007. [doi]

Key-dependent Message Security under Active Attacks - BRSIM/UC-Soundness of Symbolic Encryption with Key CyclesMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Andre Scedrov. csfw 2007: 112-124 [doi]

Information Flow in the Peer-Reviewing ProcessMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Dominique Unruh. sp 2007: 187-191 [doi]

Causality-based Abstraction of Multiplicity in Security ProtocolsMichael Backes, Agostino Cortesi, Matteo Maffei. csfw 2007: 355-369 [doi]

Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation ProtocolMichael Backes, Matteo Maffei, Dominique Unruh. dagstuhl 2008: [doi]

2006

Limits of the BRSIM/UC Soundness of Dolev-Yao Models with HashesMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. esorics 2006: 404-423 [doi]

Formal Methods and CryptographyMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. fm 2006: 612-616 [doi]

Conditional Reactive SimulatabilityMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Dennis Hofheinz, Ralf Küsters. esorics 2006: 424-443 [doi]

Secure Key-Updating for Lazy RevocationMichael Backes, Christian Cachin, Alina Oprea. esorics 2006: 327-346 [doi]

Cryptographically Sound Security Proofs for Basic and Public-Key KerberosMichael Backes, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jaggard, Andre Scedrov, Joe-Kai Tsay. esorics 2006: 362-383 [doi]

Computationally sound secrecy proofs by mechanized flow analysisMichael Backes, Peeter Laud. ccs 2006: 370-379 [doi]

Symbolic and Cryptographic Analysis of the Secure WS-ReliableMessaging ScenarioMichael Backes, Sebastian Mödersheim, Birgit Pfitzmann, Luca Viganò. fossacs 2006: 428-445 [doi]

On the Cryptographic Key Secrecy of the Strengthened Yahalom ProtocolMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. sec 2006: 233-245 [doi]

Real-or-random Key Secrecy of the Otway-Rees Protocol via a Symbolic Security ProofMichael Backes. ENTCS, 155:111-145, 2006. [doi]

Compositional analysis of contract-signing protocolsMichael Backes, Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Mathieu Turuani. TCS, 367(1-2):33-56, 2006. [doi]

Information Security, 9th International Conference, ISC 2006, Samos Island, Greece, August 30 - September 2, 2006, ProceedingsSokratis K. Katsikas, Javier Lopez, Michael Backes, Stefanos Gritzalis, Bart Preneel, editors, Volume 4176 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2006.

Cryptographically Sound Theorem ProvingChristoph Sprenger, Michael Backes, David A. Basin, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. csfw 2006: 153-166 [doi]

2005

Unifying simulatability definitions in cryptographic systems under different timing assumptionsMichael Backes. jlp, 64(2):157-188, 2005. [doi]

Reactively secure signature schemesMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. ijisec, 4(4):242-252, 2005. [doi]

Symmetric authentication in a simulatable Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic libraryMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. ijisec, 4(3):135-154, 2005. [doi]

Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic SecrecyMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. tdsc, 2(2):109-123, 2005. [doi]

Limits of the Cryptographic Realization of Dolev-Yao-Style XORMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. esorics 2005: 178-196 [doi]

Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic SecrecyMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. sp 2005: 171-182 [doi]

Public-Key Steganography with Active AttacksMichael Backes, Christian Cachin. tcc 2005: 210-226 [doi]

Lazy Revocation in Cryptographic File SystemsMichael Backes, Christian Cachin, Alina Oprea. sisw 2005: 1-11 [doi]

Anonymous yet accountable access controlMichael Backes, Jan Camenisch, Dieter Sommer. wpes 2005: 40-46 [doi]

Tailoring the Dolev-Yao abstraction to web services realitiesMichael Backes, Thomas Groß. sws 2005: 65-74 [doi]

A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of an Electronic Payment SystemMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth. csfw 2005: 78-93 [doi]

Quantifying Probabilistic Information Flow in Computational Reactive SystemsMichael Backes. esorics 2005: 336-354 [doi]

On fairness in simulatability-based cryptographic systemsMichael Backes, Dennis Hofheinz, Jörn Müller-Quade, Dominique Unruh. ccs 2005: 13-22 [doi]

Compositional Analysis of Contract Signing ProtocolsMichael Backes, Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Mathieu Turuani. csfw 2005: 94-110 [doi]

2004

Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering, FMSE 2004, Washingtion, DC, USA, October 29, 2004Vijayalakshmi Atluri, Michael Backes, David A. Basin, Michael Waidner, editors, ACM, 2004.

Polynomial livenessMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. jcs, 12(3-4):589-617, 2004.

Justifying a Dolev-Yao Model Under Active AttacksMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. fosad 2005: 1-41 [doi]

Computational probabilistic noninterferenceMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. ijisec, 3(1):42-60, 2004. [doi]

Efficient comparison of enterprise privacy policiesMichael Backes, Günter Karjoth, Walid Bagga, Matthias Schunter. SAC 2004: 375-382 [doi]

Low-Level Ideal Signatures and General Integrity IdealizationMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. iiswc 2004: 39-51 [doi]

Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic LibraryMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. csfw 2004: 204-218 [doi]

How to Break and Repair a Universally Composable Signature FunctionalityMichael Backes, Dennis Hofheinz. iiswc 2004: 61-72 [doi]

Unification in Privacy Policy Evaluation - Translating EPAL into PrologMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Günter Karjoth. policy 2004: 185-188 [doi]

An Algebra for Composing Enterprise Privacy PoliciesMichael Backes, Markus Dürmuth, Rainer Steinwandt. esorics 2004: 33-52 [doi]

A General Composition Theorem for Secure Reactive SystemsMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. tcc 2004: 336-354 [doi]

A Cryptographically Sound Dolev-Yao Style Security Proof of the Otway-Rees ProtocolMichael Backes. esorics 2004: 89-108 [doi]

A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocolMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. jsac, 22(10):2075-2086, 2004. [doi]

2003

Symmetric Authentication within a Simulatable Cryptographic LibraryMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. esorics 2003: 271-290 [doi]

Proactive secure message transmission in asynchronous networksMichael Backes, Christian Cachin, Reto Strobl. podc 2003: 223-232 [doi]

A Toolkit for Managing Enterprise Privacy PoliciesMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Matthias Schunter. esorics 2003: 162-180 [doi]

A composable cryptographic library with nested operationsMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. ccs 2003: 220-230 [doi]

Unifying Simulatability Definitions in Cryptographic Systems under Different Timing AssumptionsMichael Backes. concur 2003: 346-360 [doi]

Reactively Secure Signature SchemesMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. iiswc 2003: 84-95 [doi]

Reliable Broadcast in a Computational Hybrid Model with Byzantine Faults, Crashes, and RecoveriesMichael Backes, Christian Cachin. dsn 2003: 37-46 [doi]

Intransitive Non-Interference for Cryptographic PurposeMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. sp 2003: 140 [doi]

Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering, FMSE 2003, Washington, DC, USA, October 30, 2003Michael Backes, David A. Basin, editors, ACM, 2003.

From absence of certain vulnerabilities towards security proofs: pushing the limits of formal verificationMichael Backes, Matthias Schunter. nspw 2003: 67-74 [doi]

Security in Business Process EngineeringMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner. BPM 2003: 168-183 [doi]

Relating cryptography and formal methods: a panelMichael Backes, Catherine Meadows, John C. Mitchell. ccs 2003: 61-66 [doi]

A Cryptographically Sound Security Proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public-Key ProtocolMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. fsttcs 2003: 1-12 [doi]

Cryptographically Sound and Machine-Assisted Verification of Security ProtocolsMichael Backes, Christian Jacobi 0002. STACS 2003: 675-686 [doi]

2002

Polynomial Fairness and LivenessMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Steiner, Michael Waidner. csfw 2002: 160-174 [doi]

Computational Probabilistic Non-interferenceMichael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann. esorics 2002: 1-23 [doi]

Deriving Cryptographically Sound Implementations Using Composition and Formally Verified BisimulationMichael Backes, Christian Jacobi 0002, Birgit Pfitzmann. fm 2002: 310-329 [doi]