Abstract is missing.
- Ranking systems: the PageRank axiomsAlon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz. 1-8 [doi]
- Graceful service degradation (or, how to know your payment is late)Alexandr Andoni, Jessica Staddon. 9-18 [doi]
- Dynamic and secure B2B e-contract update managementSamuil Angelov, Sven Till, Paul W. P. J. Grefen. 19-28 [doi]
- On the computational power of iterative auctionsLiad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan. 29-43 [doi]
- Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained biddersChristian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Saberi. 44-51 [doi]
- Fairness and optimality in congestion gamesDeeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan. 52-57 [doi]
- Information markets vs. opinion pools: an empirical comparisonYiling Chen, Chao-Hsien Chu, Tracy Mullen, David M. Pennock. 58-67 [doi]
- Content availability, pollution and poisoning in file sharing peer-to-peer networksNicolas Christin, Andreas S. Weigend, John Chuang. 68-77 [doi]
- Communication complexity of common voting rulesVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 78-87 [doi]
- Complexity of (iterated) dominanceVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 88-97 [doi]
- Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levelsEsther David, Alex Rogers, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kraus, Nicholas R. Jennings. 98-107 [doi]
- True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphsEdith Elkind. 108-116 [doi]
- Hidden-action in multi-hop routingMichal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker. 117-126 [doi]
- A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clustersMichal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang. 127-136 [doi]
- Inefficiency in provisioning interconnected communication networksPedro Ferreira, Marvin A. Sirbu. 137-146 [doi]
- Privacy-preserving credit checkingKeith B. Frikken, Mikhail J. Atallah, Chen Zhang. 147-154 [doi]
- Secure distributed human computationCraig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart G. Stubblebine. 155-164 [doi]
- Online auctions with re-usable goodsMohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David C. Parkes. 165-174 [doi]
- From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctionsJason D. Hartline, Robert McGrew. 175-182 [doi]
- Robust solutions for combinatorial auctionsAlan Holland, Barry O Sullivan. 183-192 [doi]
- Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional gamesSamuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham. 193-202 [doi]
- First-price path auctionsNicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami. 203-212 [doi]
- Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general frameworkMing-Yang Kao, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang. 213-222 [doi]
- Self-selection, slipping, salvaging, slacking, and stoning: the impacts of negative feedback at eBayTapan Khopkar, Xin Li, Paul Resnick. 223-231 [doi]
- Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem using the Shapley valueDebasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan. 232-239 [doi]
- On decentralized incentive compatible mechanismsAhuva Mu alem. 240-248 [doi]
- ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchangeDavid C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam I. Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan. 249-258 [doi]
- Congestion games with failuresMichal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz. 259-268 [doi]
- Integrating tradeoff support in product search tools for e-commerce sitesPearl Pu, Li Chen. 269-278 [doi]
- Nearly optimal multi attribute auctionsAmir Ronen, Daniel J. Lehmann. 279-285 [doi]
- Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domainsMichael E. Saks, Lan Yu. 286-293 [doi]