Abstract is missing.
- On the complexity of nash dynamics and sink equilibriaVahab S. Mirrokni, Alexander Skopalik. 1-10 [doi]
- On representing coalitional games with externalitiesTomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Jacek Sroka, Andrew Dowell, Michael J. Wooldridge, Peter McBurney, Nicholas R. Jennings. 11-20 [doi]
- Pricing traffic in a spanning networkHervé Moulin. 21-30 [doi]
- A new perspective on implementation by voting treesFelix A. Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alex Samorodnitsky. 31-40 [doi]
- Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism designNikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline. 41-50 [doi]
- Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctionsDavid Robert Martin Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 51-60 [doi]
- Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellationsMoshe Babaioff, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg. 61-70 [doi]
- The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutationsNikhil R. Devenur, Thomas P. Hayes. 71-78 [doi]
- Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms: extended abstractMoshe Babaioff, Yogeshwer Sharma, Aleksandrs Slivkins. 79-88 [doi]
- Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctionsFlorin Constantin, David C. Parkes. 89-98 [doi]
- The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctionsNikhil R. Devanur, Sham M. Kakade. 99-106 [doi]
- Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auctionRenato D. Gomes, Kane S. Sweeney. 107-108 [doi]
- Eliciting truthful answers to multiple-choice questionsNicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham. 109-118 [doi]
- Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctionsDominic DiPalantino, Milan Vojnovic. 119-128 [doi]
- Designing incentives for online question and answer forumsShaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes. 129-138 [doi]
- Substitutes or complements: another step forward in recommendationsJiaqian Zheng, Xiaoyuan Wu, Junyu Niu, Alvaro Bolivar. 139-146 [doi]
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verificationPaolo Penna, Carmine Ventre. 147-156 [doi]
- Network bargaining: algorithms and structural resultsTanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna. 159-168 [doi]
- An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanismsItai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi. 169-176 [doi]
- Approximate mechanism design without moneyAriel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz. 177-186 [doi]
- On random sampling auctions for digital goodsSaeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Aravind Srinivasan. 187-196 [doi]
- A qualitative vickrey auctionPaul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conitzer. 197-206 [doi]
- Destroy to saveGeoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Amy R. Greenwald. 207-214 [doi]
- Managing the quality of CPC trafficBobji Mungamuru, Hector Garcia-Molina. 215-224 [doi]
- Simple versus optimal mechanismsJason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden. 225-234 [doi]
- Efficiency of (revenue-)optimal mechanismsGagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta. 235-242 [doi]
- Revenue submodularityShaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan. 243-252 [doi]
- Information aggregation in dynamic markets with strategic tradersMichael Ostrovsky. 253-254 [doi]
- A unified framework for dynamic pari-mutuel information market designShipra Agrawal, Erick Delage, Mark Peters, Zizhuo Wang, Yinyu Ye. 255-264 [doi]
- Collective revelation: a mechanism for self-verified, weighted, and truthful predictionsSharad Goel, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock. 265-274 [doi]
- Modeling volatility in prediction marketsNikolay Archak, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis. 275-284 [doi]
- The price of uncertaintyMaria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour. 285-294 [doi]
- Policy teaching through reward function learningHaoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen. 295-304 [doi]
- The price of anarchy in bertrand gamesShuchi Chawla, Feng Niu. 305-314 [doi]
- On the price of mediationMilan Bradonjic, Gunes Ercal-Ozkaya, Adam Meyerson, Alan Roytman. 315-324 [doi]
- Social influence and the diffusion of user-created contentEytan Bakshy, Brian Karrer, Lada A. Adamic. 325-334 [doi]
- Social lendingNing Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Nicolas S. Lambert. 335-344 [doi]
- Sybilproof transitive trust protocolsPaul Resnick, Rahul Sami. 345-354 [doi]
- An exact almost optimal algorithm for target set selection in social networksOren Ben-Zwi, Danny Hermelin, Daniel Lokshtanov, Ilan Newman. 355-362 [doi]