Abstract is missing.
- Econometrics for Learning AgentsDenis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos. 1-18 [doi]
- Why Prices Need AlgorithmsTim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 19-36 [doi]
- Hidden SubstitutesJohn William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers. 37 [doi]
- Full Substitutability in Trading NetworksJohn William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Westkamp. 39-40 [doi]
- Near Feasible Stable MatchingsThanh Nguyen 0001, Rakesh Vohra. 41-42 [doi]
- Decentralized Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game: Extended AbstractBary S. R. Pradelski. 43 [doi]
- Making the Most of Your SamplesZhiyi Huang 0002, Yishay Mansour, Tim Roughgarden. 45-60 [doi]
- Commitment Without Regrets: Online Learning in Stackelberg Security GamesMaria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Nika Haghtalab, Ariel D. Procaccia. 61-78 [doi]
- Online Reputation Management: Estimating the Impact of Management Responses on Consumer ReviewsDavide Proserpio, Georgios Zervas. 79 [doi]
- Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller MessagesDimitriy V. Masterov, Uwe F. Mayer, Steven Tadelis. 81-93 [doi]
- Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticultural PerspectiveNicolas Bousquet, Zhentao Li, Adrian Vetta. 95-112 [doi]
- Bidding Games and Efficient AllocationsGil Kalai, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz. 113-130 [doi]
- Near-Optimum Online Ad Allocation for Targeted AdvertisingJoseph Naor, David Wajc. 131-148 [doi]
- Core-competitive AuctionsGagan Goel, Mohammad Reza Khani, Renato Paes Leme. 149-166 [doi]
- Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display AdvertisingNick Arnosti, Marissa Beck, Paul Milgrom. 167 [doi]
- Online Allocation with Traffic Spikes: Mixing Adversarial and Stochastic ModelsHossein Esfandiari, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni. 169-186 [doi]
- Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-RoundPaul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Éva Tardos. 187-201 [doi]
- Smooth Online Mechanisms: A Game-Theoretic Problem in Renewable Energy MarketsThomas Kesselheim, Robert D. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos. 203-220 [doi]
- Greedy Algorithms Make Efficient MechanismsBrendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis. 221-238 [doi]
- Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful MechanismsPaul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim. 239-255 [doi]
- A Non-asymptotic Approach to Analyzing Kidney Exchange GraphsYichuan Ding, Dongdong Ge, Simai He, Christopher Thomas Ryan. 257-258 [doi]
- Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional ConstraintsMasahiro Goto, Fuhiko Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, Akihisa Tamura, Makoto Yokoo. 259-260 [doi]
- Private Pareto Optimal ExchangeSampath Kannan, Jamie Morgenstern, Ryan M. Rogers, Aaron Roth. 261-278 [doi]
- An Approximate Law of One Price in Random Assignment GamesAssaf Romm, Avinatan Hassidim. 279-280 [doi]
- Designing Dynamic ContestsKostas Bimpikis, Shayan Ehsani, Mohamed Mostagir. 281-282 [doi]
- Managing Innovation in a CrowdDaron Acemoglu, Mohamed Mostagir, Asuman E. Ozdaglar. 283 [doi]
- Incentive-Compatible Experimental DesignPanos Toulis, David C. Parkes, Elery Pfeffer, James Y. Zou. 285-302 [doi]
- Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete SignalsVasilis Syrgkanis, David Kempe, Éva Tardos. 303 [doi]
- Simple Auctions with Simple StrategiesNikhil R. Devanur, Jamie Morgenstern, Vasilis Syrgkanis, S. Matthew Weinberg. 305-322 [doi]
- Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent AuctionHu Fu, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Philipp Strack. 323 [doi]
- Ignorance is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching With Few QueriesAvrim Blum, John P. Dickerson, Nika Haghtalab, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm, Ankit Sharma. 325-342 [doi]
- Matching with Stochastic ArrivalNeil Thakral. 343 [doi]
- Leximin Allocations in the Real WorldDavid Kurokawa, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah 0001. 345-362 [doi]
- Competitive Analysis via Benchmark DecompositionNing Chen, Nikolai Gravin, Pinyan Lu. 363-376 [doi]
- Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue MonotonicityAviad Rubinstein, S. Matthew Weinberg. 377-394 [doi]
- Public Projects, Boolean Functions, and the Borders of Border's TheoremParikshit Gopalan, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden. 395 [doi]
- Improved Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with BudgetsPinyan Lu, Tao Xiao. 397-413 [doi]
- Truthful Mechanism Design via Correlated Tree RoundingYossi Azar, Martin Hoefer, Idan Maor, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Berthold Vöcking. 415-432 [doi]
- Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget ConstraintsConstantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg. 433-447 [doi]
- Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good MonopolistConstantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos. 449-450 [doi]
- Customer Referral Incentives and Social MediaIlan Lobel, Evan Sadler, Lav R. Varshney. 451 [doi]
- Estimating the Causal Impact of Recommendation Systems from Observational DataAmit Sharma, Jake M. Hofman, Duncan J. Watts. 453-470 [doi]
- Inducing Approximately Optimal Flow Using Truthful MediatorsRyan M. Rogers, Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman, Zhiwei Steven Wu. 471-488 [doi]
- The Burden of Risk Aversion in Mean-Risk Selfish RoutingEvdokia Nikolova, Nicolás E. Stier Moses. 489-506 [doi]
- At What Quality and What Price?: Eliciting Buyer Preferences as a Market Design ProblemJohn Joseph Horton, Ramesh Johari. 507 [doi]
- Procurement Mechanisms for Differentiated ProductsDaniela Sabán, Gabriel Y. Weintraub. 509 [doi]
- Team Performance with Test ScoresJon M. Kleinberg, Maithra Raghu. 511-528 [doi]
- Mechanisms for Fair AttributionEric Balkanski, Yaron Singer. 529-546 [doi]
- Sound Auction Specification and ImplementationMarco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange 0002, Colin Rowat. 547-564 [doi]
- Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit ExplorationYishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis. 565-582 [doi]
- Integrating Market Makers, Limit Orders, and Continuous Trade in Prediction MarketsHoda Heidari, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 583-600 [doi]
- Learning What's Going on: Reconstructing Preferences and Priorities from Opaque TransactionsAvrim Blum, Yishay Mansour, Jamie Morgenstern. 601-618 [doi]
- Low-Cost Learning via Active Data ProcurementJacob D. Abernethy, Yiling Chen, Chien-Ju Ho, Bo Waggoner. 619-636 [doi]
- The Impact of the Sharing Economy on the Hotel Industry: Evidence from Airbnb's Entry Into the Texas MarketGeorgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio, John W. Byers. 637 [doi]
- Pricing in Ride-Sharing Platforms: A Queueing-Theoretic ApproachSiddhartha Banerjee, Ramesh Johari, Carlos Riquelme. 639 [doi]
- Bias and Reciprocity in Online Reviews: Evidence From Field Experiments on AirbnbAndrey Fradkin, Elena Grewal, Dave Holtz, Matthew Pearson. 641 [doi]
- The Wisdom of Multiple GuessesJohan Ugander, Ryan Drapeau, Carlos Guestrin. 643-660 [doi]
- Generalized Decision Scoring Rules: Statistical, Computational, and Axiomatic PropertiesLirong Xia. 661-678 [doi]
- Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect TheoryDavid Easley, Arpita Ghosh. 679-696 [doi]
- Dynamic Fair Division with Minimal DisruptionsEric J. Friedman, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi. 697-713 [doi]
- Truthful Online Scheduling with CommitmentsYossi Azar, Inna Kalp-Shaltiel, Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache, Joseph Naor, Jonathan Yaniv. 715-732 [doi]
- Markets with Production: A Polynomial Time Algorithm and a Reduction to Pure ExchangeJugal Garg, Ravi Kannan. 733-749 [doi]
- Short Lists in Centralized ClearinghousesNick Arnosti. 751 [doi]
- Redesigning the Israeli Medical Internship MatchSlava Bronfman, Noga Alon, Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm. 753-754 [doi]
- Assigning More Students to their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule ComparisonItai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad, Assaf Romm. 755-756 [doi]
- Reverse Mechanism DesignNima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline. 757-758 [doi]
- Price Competition, Fluctuations and Welfare GuaranteesMoshe Babaioff, Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan. 759-776 [doi]
- Robust Dynamic Pricing With Strategic CustomersYiwei Chen, Vivek F. Farias. 777 [doi]
- Combining Traditional Marketing and Viral Marketing with Amphibious Influence MaximizationWei Chen, Fu Li, Tian Lin, Aviad Rubinstein. 779-796 [doi]
- Approximability of Adaptive Seeding under Knapsack ConstraintsAviad Rubinstein, Lior Seeman, Yaron Singer. 797-814 [doi]
- Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is HardSiddharth Barman, Katrina Ligett. 815-816 [doi]
- Faster First-Order Methods for Extensive-Form Game SolvingChristian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinç-Karzan, Tuomas Sandholm. 817-834 [doi]