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| 300 | -- | 306 | Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille. An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games |
| 307 | -- | 314 | Federico Echenique, Tarun Sabarwal. Strong comparative statics of equilibria |
| 315 | -- | 318 | Wojciech Olszewski. A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem |
| 319 | -- | 326 | Asher Wolinsky. Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain |
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