Journal: Games and Economic Behavior

Volume 68, Issue 2

413 -- 427Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Nick Netzer. The logit-response dynamics
428 -- 442Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Zaifu Yang. Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages
443 -- 468Joyce E. Berg, John Dickhaut, Thomas A. Rietz. Preference reversals: The impact of truth-revealing monetary incentives
469 -- 487Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchón. Peace agreements without commitment
488 -- 511Andreas Blume, Uri Gneezy. Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study
512 -- 531Endre Boros, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Vladimir Gurvich, Kazuhisa Makino. On effectivity functions of game forms
532 -- 550Markus Brunnermeier, John Morgan. Clock games: Theory and experiments
551 -- 556Gary Charness, Edi Karni, Dan Levin. On the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: New experimental evidence regarding Linda
557 -- 579Yan Chen, Kan Takeuchi. Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
580 -- 601Gabrielle Demange. Sharing information in Web communities
602 -- 613Ronen Gradwohl, Omer Reingold. Partial exposure in large games
614 -- 625Emily C. Haisley, Roberto A. Weber. Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior
626 -- 633P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan, A. J. J. Talman, Zaifu Yang. The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
634 -- 645Andreas Lange, Anmol Ratan. Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions - How (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
646 -- 669Gea M. Lee. Optimal collusion with internal contracting
670 -- 682Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg, Eran Shmaya. Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
683 -- 688Andrew McLennan, Rabee Tourky. Simple complexity from imitation games
689 -- 702Nikos Nikiforakis. Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments
703 -- 715Sérgio O. Parreiras, Anna Rubinchik. Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
716 -- 730Scott Rick, Roberto A. Weber. Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback
731 -- 747Roman M. Sheremeta. Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
748 -- 762Artyom Shneyerov, Adam Chi Leung Wong. Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
763 -- 772Juan Carlos Carbajal. On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
773 -- 780Scott Duke Kominers. Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
781 -- 788Imran Rasul, Silvia Sonderegger. The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships
789 -- 792Aviad Heifetz. Games and science

Volume 68, Issue 1

1 -- 14Steve Alpern, Shmuel Gal, Eilon Solan. A sequential selection game with vetoes
15 -- 22Eyal Beigman. Simple games with many effective voters
23 -- 34Chris Bidner. Pre-match investment with frictions
35 -- 49Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai. Secure implementation in allotment economies
50 -- 59Marco Castillo, Ragan Petrie. Discrimination in the lab: Does information trump appearance?
60 -- 76Damian S. Damianov, Jörg Oechssler, Johannes Gerd Becker. Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence
77 -- 94Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz. On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium
95 -- 107Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Sigve Tjøtta, Gaute Torsvik. Testing guilt aversion
108 -- 129Amanda Friedenberg. When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?
130 -- 143Gabrielle Gayer. Perception of probabilities in situations of risk: A case based approach
144 -- 154Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu. Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
155 -- 179Joseph Y. Halpern. Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
180 -- 191Florian Herold. Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
192 -- 207Maarten C. W. Janssen, Santanu Roy. Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly
208 -- 219Olof Johansson-Stenman. Risk aversion and expected utility of consumption over time
220 -- 232Çagatay Kayi, Eve Ramaekers. Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
233 -- 241Özgür Kibris, Ipek Gürsel Tapki. Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules
242 -- 254Chongmin Kim, Kam-Chau Wong. Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
255 -- 274Sebastian Kranz. Moral norms in a partly compliant society
275 -- 302François Maniquet, Yves Sprumont. Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
303 -- 324Michal Ramsza, Robert M. Seymour. Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment
325 -- 338Julian Rode. Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context
339 -- 352Alexander Sebald. Attribution and reciprocity
353 -- 375Curtis R. Taylor, Huseyin Yildirim. Public information and electoral bias
376 -- 380Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser, Uday Rajan. On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
381 -- 388Guilherme Carmona. Polytopes and the existence of approximate equilibria in discontinuous games
389 -- 402Yi-Chun Chen. Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure
403 -- 410Mark Voorneveld. The possibility of impossible stairways: Tail events and countable player sets
411 -- 0Moshe Dror, Greys Sosic. Behavioral & Quantitative Game Theory Conference on Future Directions May 14-16, 2010, Fairmont Hotel, Newport Beach, CA