| 1 | -- | 22 | Thomas Schwartz. From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives |
| 23 | -- | 36 | Ricardo Arlegi, Jorge Nieto. Ranking opportunity sets: An approach based on the preference for flexibility |
| 37 | -- | 58 | Mark Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and markets |
| 59 | -- | 64 | Fritz Grafe, Julius Grafe. Social Welfare Functions which preserve distances |
| 65 | -- | 78 | John Duggan, Michel Le Breton. Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments |
| 79 | -- | 89 | Thomas C. Ratliff. A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule |
| 91 | -- | 105 | Arieh Gavious, Shlomo Mizrahi. A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action |
| 107 | -- | 112 | Valentino Dardanoni. A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem |
| 113 | -- | 127 | Josep E. Peris, M. Carmen Sánchez. Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework |
| 129 | -- | 134 | Sylvain J. Durand. A note on monotonicity in iterated choice functions |
| 135 | -- | 153 | Suryapratim Banerjee, Hideo Konishi, Tayfun Sönmez. Core in a simple coalition formation game |
| 155 | -- | 163 | Ruth Ben-Yashar, Shmuel Nitzan. The robustness of optimal organizational architectures: A note on hierarchies and polyarchies |
| 165 | -- | 178 | Buhong Zheng. Poverty orderings: A graphical illustration |
| 179 | -- | 191 | Antonio Romero-Medina. More on preference and freedom |
| 193 | -- | 205 | William V. Gehrlein, Fabrice Valognes. Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference |