Journal: Social Choice and Welfare

Volume 26, Issue 3

435 -- 445Toyotaka Sakai, Masaki Shimoji. Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
447 -- 453Gil S. Epstein, Shmuel Nitzan. Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests
455 -- 470David P. Baron, Adam Meirowitz. Fully-Revealing Equilibria of Multiple-Sender Signaling and Screening Models
471 -- 483Satya R. Chakravarty, Ravi Kanbur, Diganta Mukherjee. Population growth and poverty measurement
485 -- 509Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley. Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules
511 -- 525Corrado Benassi, Alessandra Chirco. Income Share Elasticity and Stochastic Dominance
527 -- 545Silvia Dominguez-Martinez, Otto H. Swank. Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control
547 -- 569Guillermo Owen, Bernard Grofman. Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions
571 -- 596M. Josune Albizuri, Jesus Aurrekoetxea. Coalition Configurations and the Banzhaf Index
597 -- 601Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan. On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules
603 -- 606Luc Lauwers, Tom Van Puyenbroeck. The Balinski-Young Comparison of Divisor Methods is Transitive
607 -- 623Ipek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver. Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
625 -- 643Daniela Ambrosino, Vito Fragnelli, Maria E. Marina. Resolving an Insurance Allocation Problem: A Procedural Approach
645 -- 649Elizabeth Maggie Penn. Book Review: David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, Editors. Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks

Volume 26, Issue 2

217 -- 238Bernard De Baets, Hans De Meyer, Bart De Schuymer. Cyclic Evaluation of Transitivity of Reciprocal Relations
239 -- 253Youngsub Chun. The Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences
255 -- 261Bettina Klaus. A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences
263 -- 283Franz Dietrich. General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures
285 -- 304Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan. A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games
305 -- 331Shigehiro Serizawa. Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation
333 -- 361Marek Kaminski. A General Equilibrium Model of Multi-Party Competition
363 -- 383Alejandro Saporiti, Fernando Tohmé. Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule
385 -- 402Ran Spiegler. Argumentation in Multi-issue Debates
403 -- 419Françoise Forges. Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments
421 -- 433Dinko Dimitrov, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx, Shao Chin Sung. Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games

Volume 26, Issue 1

1 -- 21Klaus Abbink. Majority rip-off in referendum voting
23 -- 30Van Kolpin. The modeling and analysis of rotten kids
31 -- 45Sebastiano Bavetta, Vitorocco Peragine. Measuring autonomy freedom
47 -- 74Thomas Eichner, Rüdiger Pethig. Efficient nonanthropocentric nature protection
75 -- 92Giora Slutzki, Oscar Volij. Scoring of web pages and tournaments - axiomatizations
93 -- 105Gérard Hamiache. A value for games with coalition structures
107 -- 129Donald G. Saari. Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda winner?
131 -- 141Drora Karotkin, Jacob Paroush. Robustness of optimal decision rules where one of the team members is exceptionally qualified
143 -- 153Arkadii Slinko. How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
155 -- 182Guoqiang Tian. The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production
183 -- 189J. Atsu Amegashie. The 2002 Winter Olympics scandal: rent-seeking and committees
191 -- 208William V. Gehrlein. The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences
209 -- 215Richard A. Chisik, Robert J. Lemke. When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model