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| 129 | -- | 149 | Semih Koray, Arkadii Slinko. Self-selective social choice functions |
| 151 | -- | 162 | Marc Vorsatz. Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences |
| 163 | -- | 174 | Sang-Chul Suh, Quan Wen. Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems |
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