355 | -- | 364 | Maria Gallego, Norman Schofield, D. Marc Kilgour. Guest editors' introduction to the special issue on the political economy of elections and bargaining |
365 | -- | 382 | John W. Patty, Elizabeth Maggie Penn. A social choice theory of legitimacy |
383 | -- | 421 | John E. Roemer. A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters |
423 | -- | 449 | Woojin Lee. Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: the uni-dimensional case |
451 | -- | 482 | Norman Schofield, Maria Gallego, Ugur Ozdemir, Alexei Zakharov. Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey |
483 | -- | 518 | Norman Schofield, Christopher Claassen, Ugur Ozdemir, Alexei Zakharov. Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel |
519 | -- | 546 | Vincent Anesi, Philippe De Donder. Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy |
547 | -- | 563 | Johanna M. M. Goertz. Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game |
565 | -- | 589 | Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong. Bargaining over the budget |
591 | -- | 610 | Maria Eugenia Gallego, David Scoones. Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals |
611 | -- | 650 | John Duggan, Tasos Kalandrakis. A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games |