External Links

    Journal: ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.

    Volume 5, Issue 4

    0 -- 0Antje Bjelde, Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm. Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices
    0 -- 0Richard Cole 0001, Shravas Rao. Applications of α-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions
    0 -- 0Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou. The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
    0 -- 0Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi. Sequential Posted-Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations
    0 -- 0Branislav Bosanský, Simina Brânzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Troels Bjerre Lund, Peter Bro Miltersen. Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
    0 -- 0Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li, Rakesh Vohra. Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction

    Volume 5, Issue 3

    0 -- 0Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler. A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem
    0 -- 0Rafael M. Frongillo, Jens Witkowski. A Geometric Perspective on Minimal Peer Prediction
    0 -- 0Aaron D. Jaggard, Neil Lutz, Michael Schapira, Rebecca N. Wright. Dynamics at the Boundary of Game Theory and Distributed Computing
    0 -- 0Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar. Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare

    Volume 5, Issue 2

    0 -- 0Amos Azaria, David Sarne, Yonatan Aumann. Distributed Matching with Mixed Maximum-Minimum Utilities
    0 -- 0Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Shaddin Dughmi, Yaron Singer. Posting Prices with Unknown Distributions
    0 -- 0David M. Pennock, Ilya Segal. Editorial from the New TEAC Co-Editors-in-Chief
    0 -- 0Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman. An Antifolk Theorem for Large Repeated Games
    0 -- 0Vincent Conitzer, R. Preston McAfee. Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future
    0 -- 0Hau Chan, Jing Chen, Gowtham Srinivasan. Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences
    0 -- 0Felix Brandt 0001, Markus Brill. Computing Dominance-Based Solution Concepts

    Volume 5, Issue 1

    1 -- 0Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan. The AND-OR Game
    2 -- 0Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier. On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
    3 -- 0Tobias Harks, Philipp von Falkenhausen. Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
    4 -- 0Patrick Hummel, R. Preston McAfee. When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue?
    5 -- 0Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova, Jeff S. Shamma. Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty
    6 -- 0Nikhil R. Devanur, Jugal Garg, László A. Végh. A Rational Convex Program for Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets
    7 -- 0Chi-Kin Chau, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Majid Khonji. Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Allocation of Electric Power in Alternating Current Electric Systems for Smart Grid
    8 -- 0Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri. Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
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