Achieving Allocatively-Efficient and Strongly Budget-Balanced Mechanisms in the Network Flow Domain for Bounded-Rational Agents

Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Achieving Allocatively-Efficient and Strongly Budget-Balanced Mechanisms in the Network Flow Domain for Bounded-Rational Agents. In Han La Poutré, Norman M. Sadeh, Sverker Janson, editors, Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms - AAMAS 2005 Workshop, AMEC 2005, Utrecht, Netherlands, July 25, 2005, and IJCAI 2005 Workshop, TADA 2005, Edinburgh, UK, August 1, 2005, Selected and Revised Papers. Volume 3937 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 71-84, Springer, 2005. [doi]

Abstract

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