Abstract is missing.
- Strategyproofness for "Price Takers" as a Desideratum for Market DesignEduardo M. Azevedo, Eric Budish. 1 [doi]
- Market User Interface Design - (Extended Abstract)Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan. 2-4 [doi]
- Evaluating Hidden Market DesignFlorian Teschner, Christof Weinhardt. 5-17 [doi]
- Expectations: Point-Estimates, Probability Distributions, Confidence, and ForecastsDavid Rothschild. 18 [doi]
- Automated Market Makers That Enable New Settings: Extending Constant-Utility Cost FunctionsAbraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm. 19-30 [doi]
- Instructor Rating MarketsMithun Chakraborty, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Malik Magdon-Ismail, Yonatan Naamad. 31-32 [doi]
- An Experimental Study of Sponsored-Search AuctionsYeon-Koo Che, Syngjoo Choi, Jinwoo Kim. 33 [doi]
- Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rational - (Extended Abstract)Mike Ruberry, Sven Seuken. 34-35 [doi]
- Hierarchical Package Bidding: Computational Complexity and Bidder BehaviorRiko Jacob, Tobias Scheffel, Georg Ziegler, Martin Bichler. 36-37 [doi]
- Efficiency, Auctioneer Revenue, and Bidding Behavior in the Combinatorial Clock AuctionMartin Bichler, Pasha Shabalin, Jürgen Wolf. 38-39 [doi]
- A Framework for Automated Bundling and Pricing Using Purchase DataMichael Benisch, Tuomas Sandholm. 40-52 [doi]
- Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions - (Abstract)Pablo Daniel Azar, Jing Chen, Silvio Micali. 53 [doi]
- Approximation of Large Games with Applications to Uniform Price AuctionsAaron L. Bodoh-Creed. 54 [doi]
- Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items CaseRon Lavi, Sigal Oren. 55 [doi]
- Improving Allocations through Revenue Redistribution in Auctions with EntryRuggiero Cavallo. 56 [doi]
- Bubbles, Crashes and Efficiency with Double Auction MechanismsJinpeng Ma, Qiongling Li. 57 [doi]
- From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice MechanismsYan Chen, Onur Kesten. 58-59 [doi]
- Stability and Efficiency in the General-Priority-Based Assignment - (Extended Abstract)Aytek Erdil, Taro Kumano. 60-61 [doi]
- The Regulated Market for Kidneys in IranFarshad Fatemi. 62-75 [doi]
- Solids - A Combinatorial Auction for a Housing CorporationDries R. Goossens, Sander Onderstal, Frits C. R. Spieksma. 76-87 [doi]
- A Computational Monetary Market for Plug-In Electric Vehicle ChargingMatteo Vasirani, Sascha Ossowski. 88-99 [doi]
- An Online Mechanism for Multi-speed Electric Vehicle ChargingValentin Robu, Sebastian Stein, Enrico H. Gerding, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings. 100-112 [doi]