Table of Contents

• Monotonicity in Mechanism DesignDov Monderer. 1 [doi]
• Computational Aspects of EquilibriaMihalis Yannakakis. 2-13 [doi]
• A Modular Approach to Roberts TheoremShahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan. 14-23 [doi]
• Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex ValuationsAndré Berger, Rudolf Müller, Seyed Hossein Naeemi. 24-35 [doi]
• Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter AgentsClemens Thielen, Sven Oliver Krumke. 36-47 [doi]
• Partition EquilibriumMichal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz. 48-59 [doi]
• Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal MechanismsAbraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm. 60-71 [doi]
• On the Planner s Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism DesignJosé R. Correa, Nicolas Figueroa. 72-84 [doi]
• Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project ProblemsKrzysztof R. Apt, Arantza Estévez-Fernández. 85-96 [doi]
• Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion GamesTobias Harks, Max Klimm, Rolf H. Möhring. 97-108 [doi]
• Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial AgencyMoshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan. 109-121 [doi]
• The Cost of Stability in Coalitional GamesYoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii V. Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman, Jörg Rothe, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. 122-134 [doi]
• Non-clairvoyant Scheduling GamesChristoph Dürr, Nguyen Kim Thang. 135-146 [doi]
• The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper BoundsHyunwoo Jung, Kyung-Yong Chwa. 147-158 [doi]
• Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better MatchingsElliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das, Yonatan Naamad. 159-170 [doi]
• Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish RoutingElliot Anshelevich, Satish Ukkusuri. 171-182 [doi]
• Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion GamesChristine Chung, Evangelia Pyrga. 183-195 [doi]
• Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion GamesTanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna. 196-207 [doi]
• Price of Stability in Survivable Network DesignElliot Anshelevich, Bugra Caskurlu. 208-219 [doi]
• Games with Congestion-Averse UtilitiesAndrew Byde, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings. 220-232 [doi]
• A New Derandomization of AuctionsOren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, Guy Wolfovitz. 233-237 [doi]
• The Computational Complexity of Weak SaddlesFelix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Jan Hoffmann 0002. 238-249 [doi]
• Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit ToJoshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala. 250-262 [doi]
• Doing Good with Spam Is HardMartin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich, Alexander Skopalik. 263-274 [doi]
• On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth ProblemsKhaled M. Elbassioni, Rajiv Raman, Saurabh Ray, René Sitters. 275-286 [doi]
• On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum GamesFelix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein. 287-298 [doi]
• Swap BriberyEdith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko. 299-310 [doi]
• Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion GamesVittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Luca Moscardelli. 311-322 [doi]
• Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows over TimeRonald Koch, Martin Skutella. 323-334 [doi]
• Bayesian Auctions with Friends and FoesPo-An Chen, David Kempe. 335-346 [doi]
• On Equilibria for ADM Minimization GamesLeah Epstein, Asaf Levin. 347-358 [doi]