Abstract is missing.
- When the Players Are Not Expectation MaximizersAmos Fiat, Christos H. Papadimitriou. 1-14 [doi]
- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?Paul W. Goldberg. 15-17 [doi]
- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher MarketsBharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni. 18-29 [doi]
- Nash Equilibria in Fisher MarketBharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni. 30-41 [doi]
- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection GamesElliot Anshelevich, Bugra Caskurlu, Ameya Hate. 42-53 [doi]
- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit DynamicsVincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale, Giuseppe Persiano. 54-65 [doi]
- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing GamesYonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb. 66-77 [doi]
- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable GamesPranjal Awasthi, Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Or Sheffet, Santosh Vempala. 78-89 [doi]
- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design GamesVittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Gianpiero Monaco. 90-101 [doi]
- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious PlayFelix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein. 102-113 [doi]
- On Learning Algorithms for Nash EquilibriaConstantinos Daskalakis, Rafael Frongillo, Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Gregory Valiant. 114-125 [doi]
- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic GamesAlex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira. 126-137 [doi]
- A Direct Reduction from ::::k::::-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash EquilibriumUriel Feige, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 138-149 [doi]
- Responsive LotteriesUriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz. 150-161 [doi]
- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous UsersDimitris Fotakis, George Karakostas, Stavros G. Kolliopoulos. 162-173 [doi]
- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic GamesMartin Gairing, Rahul Savani. 174-185 [doi]
- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for ItGagan Goel, Vijay V. Vazirani. 186-197 [doi]
- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium RefinementsKristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen. 198-209 [doi]
- Complexity of Safe Strategic VotingNoam Hazon, Edith Elkind. 210-221 [doi]
- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of AnarchyRajgopal Kannan, Costas Busch. 222-233 [doi]
- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public ValuationsGagan Goel, Chinmay Karande, Lei Wang. 234-245 [doi]
- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation MechanismsVolodymyr Kuleshov, Adrian Vetta. 246-261 [doi]
- Braess s Paradox for Flows over TimeMartin Macko, Kate Larson, L ubos Steskal. 262-275 [doi]
- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) ConstantMatús Mihalák, Jan Christoph Schlegel. 276-287 [doi]
- Truthful Fair DivisionElchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz. 288-299 [doi]
- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. BertrandUri Nadav, Georgios Piliouras. 300-311 [doi]
- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong EquilibriaMartin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik. 312-322 [doi]
- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural PropertiesVijay V. Vazirani. 323-334 [doi]
- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion GamesBart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis Telelis. 335-346 [doi]
- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing GamesReshef Meir, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. 347-358 [doi]