Abstract is missing.
- Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear ProgrammingMete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta. 3-17 [doi]
- The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-buyer Sequential AuctionsMete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta. 18-33 [doi]
- Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved ApproximationAmeer Amer, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 34-48 [doi]
- Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility LocationAris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris. 49-63 [doi]
- Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent ValuesVasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin 0001. 64-78 [doi]
- Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent SelectionXiuzhen Zhang, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao. 79-93 [doi]
- On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash EquilibriumZhaohua Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Wenhan Huang, Hanyu Li, Yuhao Li 0002. 97-111 [doi]
- Prophet Inequality with Competing AgentsTomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer. 112-123 [doi]
- Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz GamesPaul W. Goldberg, Matthew J. Katzman. 124-139 [doi]
- Gerrymandering on Graphs: Computational Complexity and Parameterized AlgorithmsSushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain 0001, Fahad Panolan, Sanjukta Roy, Saket Saurabh 0001. 140-155 [doi]
- Game Theory on the Blockchain: A Model for Games with Smart ContractsMathias Hall-Andersen, Nikolaj I. Schwartzbach. 156-170 [doi]
- On the Complexity of Nucleolus Computation for Bipartite b-Matching GamesJochen Könemann, Justin Toth, Felix Zhou. 171-185 [doi]
- Pure Nash Equilibria in a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource FailuresJulian Nickerl, Jacobo Torán. 186-201 [doi]
- On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable MatchingJiehua Chen 0001, Adrian Chmurovic, Fabian Jogl, Manuel Sorge. 205-220 [doi]
- Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large MarketsJosé R. Correa, Dana Pizarro, Victor Verdugo. 221-235 [doi]
- Approximate Competitive Equilibrium with Generic BudgetAmin Ghiasi, Masoud Seddighin. 236-250 [doi]
- Cost Sharing in Two-Sided MarketsSreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Ali Shameli. 251-265 [doi]
- The Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates Problem with Additively Separable PreferencesMichael McKay, David F. Manlove. 266-280 [doi]
- Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How Many Strategic Agents Are Required to Turn Pessimality to Optimality?Ndiamé Ndiaye, Sergey Norin, Adrian Vetta. 281-295 [doi]
- Metric-Distortion Bounds Under Limited InformationIoannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos. 299-313 [doi]
- Hedonic Expertise GamesBugra Caskurlu, Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, Berkehan Ozen. 314-328 [doi]
- When Dividing Mixed Manna Is Easier Than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of ChoresJugal Garg, Martin Hoefer 0001, Peter McGlaughlin, Marco Schmalhofer. 329-344 [doi]
- Computing Fair and Efficient Allocations with Few Utility ValuesJugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar. 345-359 [doi]
- An Approval-Based Model for Single-Step Liquid DemocracyEvangelos Markakis, Georgios Papasotiropoulos. 360-375 [doi]
- Two Birds with One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via TransfersVishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta. 376-390 [doi]
- Pirates in Wonderland: Liquid Democracy has Bicriteria GuaranteesJonathan A. Noel, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta. 391-405 [doi]
- On Reward Sharing in Blockchain Mining PoolsBurak Can, Jens Leth Hougaard, Mohsen Pourpouneh. 409 [doi]
- On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and Correlation GapChandra Chekuri, Vasilis Livanos. 410 [doi]
- Vote Delegation and MisbehaviorHans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Manvir Schneider. 411 [doi]
- Efficiency of Equilibria in Games with Random PayoffsMatteo Quattropani, Marco Scarsini. 412 [doi]