Abstract is missing.
- On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization in Zero-Sum Matrix Games Under Noisy FeedbackArnab Maiti, Kevin G. Jamieson, Lillian J. Ratliff. 3-20 [doi]
- On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of AnarchyYunpeng Li 0007, Antonis Dimakis, Costas Courcoubetis. 21-44 [doi]
- Mixed Nash Equilibria in Discrete Tullock ContestsVittorio Bilò, Marios Mavronicolas, Paul G. Spirakis, Daniel Windisch. 45-62 [doi]
- Social Welfare in Battery Charging GamesSimon Krogmann, Pascal Lenzner, Alexander Skopalik, Tobias Sträubig. 63-80 [doi]
- Improved Hardness Results for the Clearing Problem in Financial Networks with Credit Default SwapsSimon Dohn, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Asger Klinkby. 81-98 [doi]
- Coordination Mechanisms on Unrelated Machines with Arbitrary Priority ListsShani Caduri, Tami Tamir. 99-116 [doi]
- Constant-Approximate and Constant-Strategyproof Two-Facility LocationElijah Journey Fullerton, Zeyuan Hu 0001, C. Gregory Plaxton. 119-136 [doi]
- Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Location with Optional PreferencesPanagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris. 137-155 [doi]
- Hotelling-Downs with Facility Synergy: The Mall EffectElliot Anshelevich, Jianan Lin, Noah Prisament. 156-172 [doi]
- Tractable Graph Structures in EFX OrientationVáclav Blazej, Sushmita Gupta, M. S. Ramanujan 0001, Peter Strulo. 175-190 [doi]
- Fairness Under Equal-Sized Bundles: Impossibility Results and Approximation GuaranteesAlviona Mancho, Evangelos Markakis, Nicos Protopapas. 191-208 [doi]
- Online Fair Division for Personalized 2-Value InstancesGeorgios Amanatidis, Alexandros Lolos, Evangelos Markakis, Victor Turmel. 209-227 [doi]
- A New Lower Bound for Multicolor Discrepancy with Applications to Fair DivisionIoannis Caragiannis, Kasper Green Larsen, Sudarshan Shyam. 228-246 [doi]
- When is Truthfully Allocating Chores No Harder Than Goods?Bo Li 0037, Biaoshuai Tao, Fangxiao Wang 0002, Xiaowei Wu 0001, Mingwei Yang 0002, Shengwei Zhou 0002. 247-264 [doi]
- Unsolvability and Beyond in Many-to-Many Non-bipartite Stable MatchingFrederik Glitzner, David F. Manlove. 267-285 [doi]
- Course Allocation with Credits via Stable MatchingJosé Rodríguez, David F. Manlove. 286-303 [doi]
- Bayesian Optimal Stopping with Maximum Value KnowledgePieter Kleer, Daan Noordenbos. 307-324 [doi]
- Persuading Agents in Opinion Formation GamesMartin Hoefer 0001, Tim Koglin, Tolga Tel. 325-342 [doi]
- A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured EventsChun Lau, David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin 0001. 343-360 [doi]
- Deterministic Refund MechanismsSaeed Alaei, Shuchi Chawla 0001, Zhiyi Huang, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian. 363-380 [doi]
- Near-Linear MIR Algorithms for Stochastically-Ordered PriorsGal Bahar, Omer Ben-Porat, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz. 381-401 [doi]
- Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with PredictionsGeorgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios, Guido Schäfer, Panagiotis Tsamopoulos, Artem Tsikiridis. 402-421 [doi]
- Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on GraphsKanstantsin Pashkovich, Jacob Skitsko. 422-438 [doi]
- Distortion of Multi-winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison RuleNegar Babashah, Hasti Karimi, Masoud Seddighin, Golnoosh Shahkarami. 441-464 [doi]
- Metric Distortion Under Group-Fair ObjectivesGeorgios Amanatidis, Elliot Anshelevich, Christopher Jerrett, Alexandros A. Voudouris. 465-482 [doi]
- Robustness of Voting Mechanisms to External InformationYiling Chen, Jessie Finocchiaro. 483-501 [doi]