Table of Contents

• Disentangling Exploration from ExploitationLeeat Yariv. 1 [doi]
• Dynamic Pricing and Learning under the Bass ModelShipra Agrawal 0001, Steven Yin, Assaf Zeevi. 2-3 [doi]
• Robust Repeated First Price AuctionsShipra Agrawal 0001, Eric Balkanski, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Balasubramanian Sivan. 4 [doi]
• Dynamic Placement in Refugee ResettlementNarges Ahani, Paul Gölz, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexander Teytelboym, Andrew C. Trapp. 5 [doi]
• The Strategic PerceptronSaba Ahmadi, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Avrim Blum, Keziah Naggita. 6-25 [doi]
• Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal MechanismsMohammad Akbarpour, Scott Duke Kominers, Shengwu Li, Paul R. Milgrom. 26 [doi]
• Revenue Maximization Under Unknown Private Values With Non-Obligatory InspectionSaeed Alaei, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian. 27-28 [doi]
• The Role of Accuracy in Algorithmic Process Fairness Across Multiple DomainsMichele Albach, James R. Wright. 29-49 [doi]
• Optimal Pricing with a Single PointAmine Allouah, Achraf Bahamou, Omar Besbes. 50 [doi]
• Revenue Maximization from Finite SamplesAmine Allouah, Achraf Bahamou, Omar Besbes. 51 [doi]
• Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-EffortTal Alon, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 52-69 [doi]
• Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common AgencyTal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. 70 [doi]
• Graphical Economies with ResaleGabriel P. Andrade, Rafael M. Frongillo, Sharadha Srinivasan, Elliot Gorokhovsky. 71-90 [doi]
• Online Assortment Optimization for Two-sided Matching PlatformsAli Aouad, Daniela Sabán. 91-92 [doi]
• The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPRGuy Aridor, Yeon-Koo Che, Tobias Salz. 93-94 [doi]
• On Social Networks that Support LearningItai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky. 95-96 [doi]
• Sequential Naive LearningItai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank. 97 [doi]
• Learning Product Characteristics and Consumer Preferences from Search DataLuis Armona, Greg Lewis, Georgios Zervas. 98-99 [doi]
• Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit AllocationNick Arnosti, Tim Randolph. 100 [doi]
• Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information DesignItai Ashlagi, Faidra Georgia Monachou, Afshin Nikzad. 101-102 [doi]
• Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare RationingHaris Aziz 0001, Florian Brandl. 103-104 [doi]
• Multi-Rank Smart ReservesHaris Aziz 0001, Zhaohong Sun 0001. 105-124 [doi]
• MNL-Bandit with KnapsacksAbdellah Aznag, Vineet Goyal, Noémie Périvier. 125-126 [doi]
• Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary EntitlementsMoshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige. 127 [doi]
• Regret-Minimizing Bayesian PersuasionYakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi. 128 [doi]
• Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical AnalysisMatthew Backus, Thomas Blake, Jett Pettus, Steven Tadelis. 129 [doi]
• The Limits to Learning a Diffusion ModelJackie Baek, Vivek F. Farias, Andreea Georgescu, Retsef Levi, Tianyi Peng, Deeksha Sinha, Joshua Wilde, Andrew Zheng. 130-131 [doi]
• The Landscape of Auto-bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility MaximizationSantiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo. 132-133 [doi]
• Simple Economies are Almost OptimalAmir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi. 134-135 [doi]
• iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval BiddingManuel Beyeler, Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken. 136 [doi]
• Data Tracking under CompetitionKostas Bimpikis, Ilan Morgenstern, Daniela Sabán. 137 [doi]
• Incentive-Compatible Kidney Exchange in a Slightly Semi-Random ModelAvrim Blum, Paul Gölz. 138-156 [doi]
• The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial AuctionsVitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken. 157 [doi]
• Distribution Rules Under Dichotomous Preferences: Two Out of Three Ain't BadFlorian Brandl, Felix Brandt 0001, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker 0001. 158-179 [doi]
• Proportional Dynamics in Exchange EconomiesSimina Brânzei, Nikhil R. Devanur, Yuval Rabani. 180-201 [doi]
• Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet InequalitiesAlexander Braun, Thomas Kesselheim. 202-203 [doi]
• Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited LiabilityMark Braverman, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg. 204-223 [doi]
• 99% Revenue with Constant Enhanced CompetitionLinda Cai, Raghuvansh R. Saxena. 224-241 [doi]
• On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent ItemsYang Cai 0001, Argyris Oikonomou. 242-262 [doi]
• Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed ReceiverOzan Candogan, Philipp Strack. 263 [doi]
• On Interim Envy-Free Allocation LotteriesIoannis Caragiannis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou. 264-284 [doi]
• Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable ContractsMatteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti 0001. 285-286 [doi]
• Multidimensional Apportionment through Discrepancy TheoryJavier Cembrano, José R. Correa, Victor Verdugo. 287-288 [doi]
• A Regret Analysis of Bilateral TradeNicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso R. Cesari, Roberto Colomboni, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi. 289-309 [doi]
• Improving EFX Guarantees through Rainbow Cycle NumberBhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, Ruta Mehta, Pranabendu Misra. 310-311 [doi]
• Optimal Queue DesignYeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux. 312-313 [doi]
• Robustly-Optimal Mechanism for Selling Multiple GoodsYeon-Koo Che, Weijie Zhong. 314-315 [doi]
• Revenue Maximization and Learning in Products RankingNingyuan Chen, Anran Li, Shuoguang Yang. 316-317 [doi]
• The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price AuctionsXi Chen, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar. 318 [doi]
• Stable Matchings with Restricted Preferences: Structure and ComplexityChristine T. Cheng, Will Rosenbaum. 319-339 [doi]
• Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in NetworksKrishna Dasaratha, Kevin He. 340 [doi]
• Robust Merging of InformationHenrique de Oliveira, Yuhta Ishii, Xiao Lin. 341-342 [doi]
• Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational RobustnessRahul Deb, Anne-Katrin Roesler. 343-344 [doi]
• Processing Reserves SimultaneouslyDavid Delacrétaz. 345-346 [doi]
• Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: Consensus-Halving for a Constant Number of AgentsArgyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros Hollender. 347-368 [doi]
• Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and BeyondYuan Deng, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo. 369 [doi]
• Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard MechanismsYuan Deng, Jason D. Hartline, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan. 370 [doi]
• Algorithms and Learning for Fair Portfolio DesignEmily Diana, Travis Dick, Hadi Elzayn, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth 0001, Zachary Schutzman, Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, Juba Ziani. 371-389 [doi]
• Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman. 390-408 [doi]
• Secretaries with AdvicePaul Dütting, Silvio Lattanzi, Renato Paes Leme, Sergei Vassilvitskii. 409-429 [doi]
• Optimal Feedback in ContestsJeffrey Ely, George Georgiadis, Sina Moghadas Khorasani, Luis Rayo. 430-431 [doi]
• Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: Fast Convergence Rates for Nash, Correlated, and Team EquilibriaGabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm. 432 [doi]
• Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect RandomnessMatheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg. 433-453 [doi]
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price AuctionsAris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender, Philip Lazos, Diogo Poças. 454-476 [doi]
• Overbooking with Bounded LossDaniel Freund 0001, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao. 477-478 [doi]
• Efficient Competitions and Online Learning with Strategic ForecastersRafael M. Frongillo, Robert Gomez, Anish Thilagar, Bo Waggoner. 479-496 [doi]
• How Flexible is that Functional Form?: Measuring the Restrictiveness of TheoriesDrew Fudenberg, Wayne Gao, Annie Liang. 497-498 [doi]
• Polarization in Geometric Opinion DynamicsJason Gaitonde, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos. 499-519 [doi]
• Virtues of Patience in Strategic Queuing SystemsJason Gaitonde, Éva Tardos. 520-540 [doi]
• Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with PriorsVasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa. 541-559 [doi]
• Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake UsersNegin Golrezaei, Vahideh M. Manshadi, Jon Schneider, Shreyas Sekar. 560-561 [doi]
• The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher MarketArtur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer. 562 [doi]
• Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse SelectionGuru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua R. Wang. 563-582 [doi]
• Selling to a GroupNima Haghpanah, Aditya Kuvalekar, Elliot Lipnowski. 583-584 [doi]
• Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based PreferencesXiang Han, Onur Kesten, M. Utku Ünver. 585-586 [doi]
• Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and ApplicationsKevin He, Jonathan Libgober. 587 [doi]
• The Market for Fake ReviewsSherry He, Brett Hollenbeck, Davide Proserpio. 588 [doi]
• On Modeling Human Perceptions of Allocation Policies with Uncertain OutcomesHoda Heidari, Solon Barocas, Jon M. Kleinberg, Karen Levy. 589-609 [doi]
• Targeting Makes Sample Efficiency in Auction DesignYihang Hu, Zhiyi Huang 0002, Yiheng Shen, Xiangning Wang. 610-629 [doi]
• An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation of ChoresXin Huang, Pinyan Lu. 630-631 [doi]
• Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching PlatformsNicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Alexander Wei. 632-633 [doi]
• Matching and MoneyRavi Jagadeesan, Alexander Teytelboym. 634 [doi]
• Decentralized Matching in a Probabilistic EnvironmentMobin Y. Jeloudar, Irene Lo, Tristan Pollner, Amin Saberi. 635-653 [doi]
• Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit MechanismsYaonan Jin, Shunhua Jiang, Pinyan Lu, Hengjie Zhang. 654-673 [doi]
• Robust Performance EvaluationAshwin Kambhampati. 674 [doi]
• Optimal Public Provision of Private GoodsZi Yang Kang. 675 [doi]
• Equilibrium Computation of Generalized Nash Games: A New Lagrangian-Based ApproachJong Gwang Kim. 676 [doi]
• Voting by Simultaneous VetoesMargarita Kirneva, Matías Núñez. 677-678 [doi]
• Sampling from the Gibbs Distribution in Congestion GamesPieter Kleer. 679-680 [doi]
• Optimal Stopping with Behaviorally Biased Agents: The Role of Loss Aversion and Changing Reference PointsJon M. Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg, Sigal Oren. 681-682 [doi]
• Indivisible Mixed Manna: On the Computability of MMS+PO AllocationsRucha Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Setareh Taki. 683-684 [doi]
• Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated?Jiangtao Li, Piotr Dworczak. 685-686 [doi]
• Dynamically Aggregating Diverse InformationAnnie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu, Vasilis Syrgkanis. 687-688 [doi]
• The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias-Variance Trade-offs in Data AcquisitionGuocheng Liao, Yu Su, Juba Ziani, Adam Wierman, Jianwei Huang. 689 [doi]
• Allocation with Weak Priorities and General ConstraintsYoung-San Lin, Hai Nguyen, Thành Nguyen 0001, Kemal Altinkemer. 690-691 [doi]
• Variable Decomposition for Prophet Inequalities and Optimal OrderingAllen Liu, Renato Paes Leme, Martin Pál, Jon Schneider, Balasubramanian Sivan. 692 [doi]
• Optimal Pricing of InformationShuze Liu, Weiran Shen, Haifeng Xu. 693 [doi]
• Fair Dynamic RationingVahideh H. Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh, Scott Rodilitz. 694-695 [doi]
• Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete ResourcesAntonio Miralles, Marek Pycia. 696 [doi]
• Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant RuleKamesh Munagala, Zeyu Shen, Kangning Wang. 697-717 [doi]
• Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize PrecisionEric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg. 718-733 [doi]
• From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast AggregationEric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden. 734 [doi]
• Δ-Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with IndivisibilitiesThành Nguyen 0001, Rakesh Vohra. 735-736 [doi]
• Online Learning via Offline Greedy Algorithms: Applications in Market Design and OptimizationRad Niazadeh, Negin Golrezaei, Joshua R. Wang, Fransisca Susan, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru. 737-738 [doi]
• Screening with FramesFranz Ostrizek, Denis Shishkin. 739-740 [doi]
• Choice Screen AuctionsMichael Ostrovsky. 741-742 [doi]
• In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal ApproximationDario Paccagnan, Martin Gairing. 743-744 [doi]
• Public Goods Games in Directed NetworksChristos Papadimitriou, Binghui Peng. 745-762 [doi]
• Online Stochastic Max-Weight Bipartite Matching: Beyond Prophet InequalitiesChristos Papadimitriou, Tristan Pollner, Amin Saberi, David Wajc. 763-764 [doi]
• Debt Swapping for Risk Mitigation in Financial NetworksPál András Papp, Roger Wattenhofer. 765-784 [doi]
• Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care RationingParag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver, M. Bumin Yenmez. 785-786 [doi]
• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-BidMarek Pycia, Kyle Woodward. 787 [doi]
• Improving Match Rates in Dating Markets through Assortment OptimizationIgnacio Rios, Daniela Sabán, Fanyin Zheng. 788-789 [doi]
• Quality Disclosures and Disappointment: Evidence from the Academy AwardsMichelangelo Rossi. 790-791 [doi]
• Transaction Fee Mechanism DesignTim Roughgarden. 792 [doi]
• Efficient Approximation Schemes for Stochastic Probing and Prophet ProblemsDanny Segev, Sahil Singla 0001. 793-794 [doi]
• The Price of Incentivizing Exploration: A Characterization via Thompson Sampling and Sample ComplexityMark Sellke, Aleksandrs Slivkins. 795-796 [doi]
• Convergence of a Packet Routing Model to Flows Over TimeLeon Sering, Laura Vargas Koch, Theresa Ziemke. 797-816 [doi]
• Evidence Acquisition and Voluntary DisclosureDenis Shishkin. 817-818 [doi]
• Fulfillment by Platform: Antitrust and Upstream Market PowerAmandeep Singh, Jiding Zhang, Senthil Veeraraghavan. 819 [doi]
• Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner RulesPiotr Skowron 0001. 820-840 [doi]
• Fine-Grained Complexity and Algorithms for the Schulze Voting MethodKrzysztof Sornat, Virginia Vassilevska Williams, Yinzhan Xu. 841-859 [doi]
• Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is OSP ImplementableClayton Thomas. 860 [doi]
• Retrospective Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted TerrainCan Urgun, Leeat Yariv. 861 [doi]
• Colonel Blotto Games with Favoritism: Competitions with Pre-allocations and Asymmetric EffectivenessDong Quan Vu, Patrick Loiseau. 862-863 [doi]
• Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options MarketXintong Wang, David M. Pennock, Nikhil R. Devanur, David M. Rothschild, Biaoshuai Tao, Michael P. Wellman. 864-883 [doi]
• How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?Lirong Xia. 884-885 [doi]
• A Theory of Choice Bracketing under RiskMu Zhang 0015. 886-887 [doi]
• Optimal Advertising for Information ProductsShuran Zheng, Yiling Chen 0001. 888-906 [doi]
• The Limits of Multi-task Peer PredictionShuran Zheng, Fang-Yi Yu, Yiling Chen 0001. 907-926 [doi]
• Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against IgnoranceYou Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu. 927-928 [doi]