Abstract is missing.
- Pricing Shared RidesChiwei Yan, Julia Yan, Yifan Shen. 1 [doi]
- On the Supply of Autonomous Vehicles in PlatformsDaniel Freund 0001, Ilan Lobel, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao. 2 [doi]
- Market Fragmentation and Inefficiencies in Maritime ShippingKostas Bimpikis, Giacomo Mantegazza, Salomón Wollenstein-Betech. 3 [doi]
- Equitable Congestion Pricing under the Markovian Traffic Model: An Application to BogotaAlfredo Torrico, Natthawut Boonsiriphatthanajaroen, Nikhil Garg 0001, Andrea Lodi 0001, Hugo Mainguy. 4 [doi]
- Algorithmic Cheap TalkYakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi. 5-6 [doi]
- Complexity, Communication and MisrepresentationJunya Zhou, Collin Raymond. 7-10 [doi]
- A belief-based approach to signalingFrédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala. 11 [doi]
- Encouraging a Go-GetterThomas Brzustowski. 12 [doi]
- Constant Inapproximability for Fisher MarketsArgyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender, Themistoklis Melissourgos. 13-39 [doi]
- Competitive Equilibrium for Chores: from Dual Eisenberg-Gale to a Fast, Greedy, LP-based AlgorithmBhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta, Tianlong Nan. 40 [doi]
- An Algorithm for the Assignment Game Beyond Additive ValuationsEric Balkanski, Christopher En, Yuri Faenza. 41 [doi]
- Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient ComputabilityThorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani. 42 [doi]
- Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal AuctionsYang Cai 0001, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu. 43 [doi]
- As-if Dominant Strategy MechanismsLea Nagel, Roberto Saitto. 44 [doi]
- Non-Market Screening with InvestmentVictor Augias, Eduardo Perez-Richet. 45-46 [doi]
- A mechanism-design approach to property rightsPiotr Dworczak, Ellen V. Muir. 47-48 [doi]
- Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked PreferencesFelix Brandt 0001, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-haLevi, Warut Suksompong. 49 [doi]
- Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow IndifferencesThéo Delemazure, Dominik Peters. 50 [doi]
- Committees and Equilibria: Multiwinner Approval Voting Through the Lens of Budgeting GamesAdrian Haret, Sophie Klumper, Jan Maly 0001, Guido Schäfer. 51-70 [doi]
- Monotone Randomized ApportionmentJosé Correa 0001, Paul Gölz, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Jamie Tucker-Foltz, Victor Verdugo. 71 [doi]
- Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Long-term Reference EffectsShipra Agrawal 0001, Wei Tang. 72 [doi]
- Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired EquilibriumBrian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas A. Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti 0001, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 73-74 [doi]
- Complex Dynamics in Autobidding SystemsRenato Paes Leme, Georgios Piliouras, Jon Schneider, Kelly Spendlove, Song Zuo. 75-100 [doi]
- Preferences Evolve and so Should Your Bandits: Bandits with Evolving States for Online PlatformsKhashayar Khosravi, Renato Paes Leme, Chara Podimata, Apostolis Tsorvantzis. 101 [doi]
- Managing Strategic ComplexityJeffrey Ely, Benjamin Golub, Annie Liang, Chaofeng Wu. 102 [doi]
- AI Oversight and Human Mistakes: Evidence from Centre CourtDavid Almog, Romain Gauriot, Lionel Page, Daniel Martin. 103-105 [doi]
- Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and ComputationLuca Carminati, Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti 0001, Tuomas Sandholm. 106-107 [doi]
- Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities and transaction fee mechanism designAadityan Ganesh, Jason D. Hartline, Atanu R. Sinha, Matthew vonAllmen. 108-135 [doi]
- Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online AlgorithmsTomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang. 136-158 [doi]
- Online Matching and Contention Resolution for Edge Arrivals with Vanishing ProbabilitiesWill Ma, Calum MacRury, Pranav Nuti. 159 [doi]
- The Hidden Cost of 'Zero-Commission';Simon Jantschgi. 160 [doi]
- With a Grain of Salt: Uncertain Veracity of External News and Firm DisclosuresJonathan Libgober, Beatrice Michaeli, Elyashiv Wiedman. 161 [doi]
- Information Aggregation with Costly Information AcquisitionSpyros Galanis, Sergei Mikhalishchev. 162-163 [doi]
- Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization PerspectiveGagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Paul Duetting, Federico Fusco. 164-194 [doi]
- Learning to Maximize Gains From Trade in Small MarketsMoshe Babaioff, Amitai Frey, Noam Nisan. 195 [doi]
- Active Learning for Fair and Stable Online AllocationsRiddhiman Bhattacharya, Thanh Nguyen 0001, Will Wei Sun, Mohit Tawarmalani. 196-197 [doi]
- Improving Approximation Guarantees for Maximin ShareHannaneh Akrami, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma, Setareh Taki. 198 [doi]
- Multi-item Resource Allocation for Maximizing Social Welfare under Network ExternalitiesS. Rasoul Etesami. 199-200 [doi]
- Mobility Data in Operations: Multi-Location Facility Location ProblemOzan Candogan, Yiding Feng. 201 [doi]
- User Strategization and Trustworthy AlgorithmsSarah H. Cen, Andrew Ilyas, Aleksander Madry. 202 [doi]
- Measuring Strategization in Recommendation: Users Adapt Their Behavior to Shape Future ContentSarah H. Cen, Andrew Ilyas, Jennifer Allen, Hannah Li, Aleksander Madry. 203-204 [doi]
- Human-AI Interactions and Societal PitfallsFrancisco Castro, Jian Gao, Sébastien Martin. 205 [doi]
- Privacy and Polarization: An Inference-Based FrameworkTommaso Bondi, Omid Rafieian, Yunfei (Jesse) Yao. 206-207 [doi]
- Common Knowledge, RegainedYannai A. Gonczarowski, Yoram Moses. 208 [doi]
- Dynamic Games with Noisy Informational AsymmetriesFrancesco Fabbri, Sofia Moroni. 209 [doi]
- Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information: The Blessing of Cursedness and TransparencyFranz Ostrizek, Elia Sartori. 210-211 [doi]
- Stability in Random Hedonic GamesMartin Bullinger, Sonja Kraiczy. 212 [doi]
- Making a Nash Equilibrium Resilient to CoalitionsIvan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz. 213-238 [doi]
- Nonprogressive Diffusion on Social Networks: Approximation and ApplicationsYunduan Lin, Heng Zhang 0008, Renyu Zhang, Zuo-Jun Max Shen. 239 [doi]
- Community Enforcement with Endogenous RecordsHarry Pei. 240 [doi]
- How effective is the High Stock Delivery Windows Information Sharing Policy for Online PlatformsDo Yoon Kim, Benjamin Knight, Dmitry Mitrofanov. 241 [doi]
- Ex-Post Equilibrium Market RecommendationsShai Vardi, Chris Parker. 242 [doi]
- Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food AllocationMarios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas 0001, Paritosh Verma. 243 [doi]
- A Data-driven Approach to Improve Artisans' Productivity in Distributed Supply ChainsDivya Singhvi, Somya Singhvi, Xinyu Zhang. 244-245 [doi]
- Optimal Stopping with Interdependent ValuesSimon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser. 246-265 [doi]
- Setting Targets is All You Need: Improved Order Competitive Ratio for Online SelectionLiyan Chen, Nuozhou Sun, Zhihao Gavin Tang. 263-277 [doi]
- Approximating Optimum Online for Capacitated Resource AllocationAlexander Braun, Thomas Kesselheim, Tristan Pollner, Amin Saberi. 278 [doi]
- Improved Bounds for Fractional Online Matching ProblemsZhihao Gavin Tang, Yuhao Zhang 0001. 279-307 [doi]
- The Impact of Race-Blind and Test-Optional Admissions on Racial Diversity and MeritAllen Sirolly, Yash Kanoria, Hongyao Ma. 308 [doi]
- Redesigning Service Level Agreements: Equity and Efficiency in City Government OperationsZhi Liu, Nikhil Garg 0001. 309 [doi]
- Explainable Affirmative ActionCarlos Bonet, Nick Arnosti, Jay Sethuraman. 310 [doi]
- Equal Pay for Similar WorkDiego Gentile Passaro, Fuhito Kojima, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson. 311 [doi]
- Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden ActionsMartino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli. 312 [doi]
- Revisiting the First-Order-Approach to Principal-Agent ProblemsHang Jiang, Chen Jin, Luyi Yang. 313-314 [doi]
- Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?Yurong Chen 0002, Zhaohua Chen 0001, Xiaotie Deng, Zhiyi Huang 0002. 315-344 [doi]
- Monitoring with Rich DataMira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii. 345 [doi]
- The Dedicated Docket in U.S. Immigration Courts: An analysis of fairness and efficiency propertiesDaniel Freund 0001, Wentao Weng. 346 [doi]
- Equilibria, Efficiency, and Inequality in Network Formation for Hiring and OpportunityCynthia Dwork, Chris Hays, Jon M. Kleinberg, Manish Raghavan. 347-371 [doi]
- Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice RulesOguzhan Celebi. 372 [doi]
- Target the vulnerable? An analysis of rapid rehousing prioritizationFelipe Simon, Nick Arnosti. 373 [doi]
- Social Learning through Action-SignalsWenji Xu. 374 [doi]
- Social Learning with Bounded Rationality: Negative Reviews Persist under Newest FirstJackie Baek, Atanas Dinev, Thodoris Lykouris. 375 [doi]
- Learning about InformativenessWanying Huang. 376 [doi]
- Learning from Viral ContentKrishna Dasaratha, Kevin He. 377 [doi]
- Two-Timescale Q-Learning with Function Approximation in Zero-Sum Stochastic GamesZaiwei Chen, Kaiqing Zhang, Eric Mazumdar, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Adam Wierman. 378 [doi]
- On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price AuctionsAris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender, Charalampos Kokkalis. 379-399 [doi]
- Nonlinear Fixed Points and Stationarity: Economic ApplicationsSimone Cerreia-Vioglio, Giacomo Lanzani, Roberto Corrao. 400 [doi]
- A Smoothed FPTAS for Equilibria in Congestion GamesYiannis Giannakopoulos. 401-413 [doi]
- Costly Capacity Signaling Increases Matching Efficiency: Evidence from a Field ExperimentApostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton, Prasanna Parasurama, Diego Urraca. 414-415 [doi]
- Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental AnalysisYannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai, Clayton Thomas. 416-417 [doi]
- Stable Matching as TransportationFederico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy. 418 [doi]
- When Geography Shapes Preferences: Redesigning Teacher Assignment in ItalyMariagrazia Cavallo, Battal Dogan. 419 [doi]
- Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent ItemsMahsa Derakhshan, Emily Ryu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eric Xue 0001. 420-446 [doi]
- Approximate Combinatorial Auctions with BudgetsThành Nguyen 0001, Alexander Teytelboym. 447 [doi]
- Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and MatroidsAlon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan. 448-464 [doi]
- Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item CompetitorsLinda Cai, Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier. 465 [doi]
- Forecasting for Swap Regret for All Downstream AgentsAaron Roth 0001, Mirah Shi. 466-488 [doi]
- Calibrated Forecasting and PersuasionAtulya Jain, Vianney Perchet. 489 [doi]
- Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in GamesEshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Jon Schneider. 490-510 [doi]
- Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret AgentsNatalie Collina, Aaron Roth 0001, Han Shao. 511-541 [doi]
- Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market PlacesAlon Eden, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes. 542 [doi]
- Duopoly Assortment Competition under the Multinomial Logit Model: Simultaneous vs. SequentialKameng Nip, Changjun Wang. 543 [doi]
- The Welfare Effects of Selling Leads in a Two-Sided MarketplacePeng Shi 0002. 544 [doi]
- Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue MaximizationLuca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes. 545-546 [doi]
- Dynamic Evidence Disclosure: Delay the Good to Accelerate the BadJan Knoepfle, Juia Salmi. 547 [doi]
- Learning from Strategic SourcesKailin Chen. 548-572 [doi]
- Robust Predictions in Games with Rational InattentionTommaso Denti, Doron Ravid. 573 [doi]
- Dynamic Competition for AttentionJan Knoepfle. 574 [doi]
- Full Dynamic ImplementationAndrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, Kei Uzui. 575-576 [doi]
- Managing Newsvendors: A Demand MechanismYilun Chen, Jiaqi Lu. 577 [doi]
- Incentivizing Resource PoolingChen Chen 0038, Yilun Chen, Pengyu Qian. 578-579 [doi]
- Optimal Queueing RegimesMarco Scarsini, Eran Shmaya. 580 [doi]
- Can LLMs Mimic Human-Like Mental Accounting and Behavioral Biases?Yan Leng. 581 [doi]
- Eliciting Informative Text Evaluations with Large Language ModelsYuxuan Lu 0001, Shengwei Xu, Yichi Zhang 0003, Yuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck. 582-612 [doi]
- Using GPT for Market ResearchJames Brand, Ayelet Israeli, Donald Ngwe. 613 [doi]
- Large Language Models as Simulated Economic Agents: What Can We Learn from Homo Silicus?Apostolos Filippas, John J. Horton, Benjamin S. Manning. 614-615 [doi]
- Contract Design With Safety InspectionsAlireza Fallah 0001, Michael I. Jordan. 616-638 [doi]
- Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information AcquisitionYingkai Li, Jonathan Libgober. 639 [doi]
- Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited LiabilityNatalie Collina, Varun Gupta 0006, Aaron Roth 0001. 640-668 [doi]
- Information Design in the Principal-Agent ProblemYakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi. 669-670 [doi]
- Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choiceJon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Emily Ryu, Éva Tardos. 671-672 [doi]
- Dynamic Matching with Post-allocation Service and its Application to Refugee ResettlementKirk Bansak, Soonbong Lee, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh, Elisabeth Paulson. 673 [doi]
- Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and EngagementIrene Lo, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Scott Rodilitz, Ali Shameli. 674 [doi]
- Wisdom and Foolishness of Noisy Matching MarketsKenny Peng, Nikhil Garg 0001. 675 [doi]
- Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake ProtocolsMatheus V. X. Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan, Hannah Huh, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu. 676-702 [doi]
- Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism DesignAadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg. 703 [doi]
- The Economic Limits of Permissionless ConsensusEric Budish, Andrew Lewis-Pye, Tim Roughgarden. 704-731 [doi]
- The Geometry of Constant Function Market MakersGuillermo Angeris, Tarun Chitra, Theo Diamandis, Kshitij Kulkarni, Alex Evans. 732 [doi]
- Alpha-Rank-Collections: Analyzing Expected Strategic Behavior with Uncertain UtilitiesFabian Raoul Pieroth, Martin Bichler. 733 [doi]
- A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision MakingTomás Masarík, Grzegorz Pierczynski, Piotr Skowron 0001. 734-754 [doi]
- The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging RankingsPatrick Lederer, Dominik Peters, Tomasz Was. 755 [doi]
- Fair, Manipulation-Robust, and Transparent SortitionCarmel Baharav, Bailey Flanigan. 756-775 [doi]
- Adaptive Neyman AllocationJinglong Zhao. 776 [doi]
- Enhancing External Validity in Experiments with Ongoing SamplingChen Wang, Shichao Han, Shan Huang. 777 [doi]
- When Is Heterogeneity Actionable for Targeting?Anya Shchetkina, Ron Berman. 778-779 [doi]
- Experimenting under Stochastic CongestionShuangning Li, Ramesh Johari, Kuang Xu, Stefan Wager. 780 [doi]
- Sample-Based Matroid Prophet InequalitiesHu Fu 0001, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Hongxun Wu, Jinzhao Wu, Qianfan Zhang 0002. 781 [doi]
- Improved Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities for Graphical DependenciesVasilis Livanos, Kalen Patton, Sahil Singla 0001. 782-805 [doi]
- Planning against a prophet: a graph-theoretic framework for making sequential decisionsAndrés Cristi, Sigal Oren. 806 [doi]
- The Competition Complexity of Prophet InequalitiesJohannes Brustle, José Correa 0001, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo. 807-830 [doi]
- Behavioral measures improve AI hiring: A field experimentMarie-Pierre Dargnies, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler. 831-832 [doi]
- The Impact of AI Technology on the Productivity of Gig Economy WorkersBenjamin Knight, Dmitry Mitrofanov, Serguei Netessine. 833 [doi]
- Artificial Intelligence in the Knowledge EconomyEnrique Ide, Eduard Talamàs. 834-836 [doi]
- The Effects of Self-Advertising in a Labor Market: Evidence from a Field ExperimentApostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton, Prasanna Parasurama, Diego Urraca. 837-838 [doi]
- Competitive Markets for Personal DataSimone Galperti, Tianhao Liu, Jacopo Perego. 839 [doi]
- Information Design and Pricing of Supply Competition in Lead-Selling PlatformsYanwei Sun, Niloofar Zamani Foroushani, Zhe Liu 0035, Jiahua Wu. 840 [doi]
- Learning to Rank under Strategic "Brush Wars"Qinzhen Li, Yifan Feng, Hongfan (kevin) Chen. 841 [doi]
- Platform Disintermediation: Information Effects and Pricing RemediesShreyas Sekar, Auyon Siddiq. 842 [doi]
- Inference for an Algorithmic Fairness-Accuracy FrontierYiqi Liu, Francesca Molinari. 843 [doi]
- An Alternative Approach for Nonparametric Analysis of Random Utility ModelsChristopher Turansick. 844 [doi]
- Preference RegressionPeter Caradonna. 845-848 [doi]
- On the limitations of data-based price discriminationHaitian Xie, Ying Zhu, Denis Shishkin. 849-850 [doi]
- From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based PricingTan Gan, Nicholas T. Wu. 851 [doi]
- Certification Design for a Competitive MarketAndreas Alexander Haupt, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier. 852 [doi]
- Robust Advertisement PricingTan Gan, Hongcheng Li. 853-854 [doi]
- Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible LearningDoron Ravid, Jeffrey Mensch. 855 [doi]
- Supply and demand function competition in input-output networksMatteo Bizzarri. 856 [doi]
- Bundling Demand in K-12 Broadband ProcurementGaurab Aryal, Charles Murry, Pallavi Pal, Arnab Palit. 857-858 [doi]
- Exclusive Contracts in the Video Streaming MarketYihao Yuan. 859-862 [doi]
- A Strategic Model of Software Dependency NetworksCornelius Fritz, Co-Pierre Georg, Angelo Mele, Michael Schweinberger. 863-892 [doi]
- Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price AuctionsRachitesh Kumar, Jon Schneider, Balasubramanian Sivan. 893 [doi]
- Strategizing against No-Regret Learners in First-Price AuctionsAviad Rubinstein, Junyao Zhao 0001. 894-921 [doi]
- Bandit Sequential Posted Pricing via Half-ConcavitySahil Singla 0001, Yifan Wang. 922-939 [doi]
- Bandit Profit-Maximization for Targeted MarketingJoon Suk Huh, Ellen Vitercik, Kirthevasan Kandasamy. 940 [doi]
- Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete VotesDaniel Halpern 0002, Safwan Hossain, Jamie Tucker-Foltz. 941-963 [doi]
- Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee VotingMashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen. 964-983 [doi]
- Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p, q)-Veto CoreBen Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan. 984 [doi]
- Generative Social ChoiceSara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Gili Rusak, Itai Shapira, Manuel Wüthrich. 985 [doi]
- Augmenting Batch Exchanges with Constant Function Market MakersGeoffrey Ramseyer, Mohak Goyal, Ashish Goel, David Mazières. 986-1016 [doi]
- Undetectable Selfish MiningMaryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg. 1017-1044 [doi]
- Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism DesignHao Chung, Tim Roughgarden, Elaine Shi. 1045-1073 [doi]
- Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee MechanismsYotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish. 1074-1096 [doi]
- Optimal Cohort PartitionsSofoklis Goulas, Faidra Monachou. 1097 [doi]
- Algorithmic Precision and Human Decision: A Study of Interactive Optimization for School SchedulesArthur Delarue, Zhen Lian, Sébastien Martin. 1098 [doi]
- Machine Learning-Powered Course AllocationErmis Soumalias, Behnoosh Zamanlooy, Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken. 1099 [doi]
- GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep LearningTonghan Wang 0003, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes. 1100 [doi]
- Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening TargetsSantiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Song Zuo. 1101 [doi]
- Understanding Iterative Combinatorial Auction Designs via Multi-Agent Reinforcement LearningGreg d'Eon, Neil Newman, Kevin Leyton-Brown. 1102-1130 [doi]
- The Surprising Benefits of Base Rate Neglect in Robust AggregationYuqing Kong, Shu Wang, Ying Wang. 1131 [doi]
- Restricting Entries to All-Pay ContestsFupeng Sun, Yanwei Sun, Chiwei Yan, Li Jin 0004. 1132 [doi]
- Full Accuracy Scoring Accelerates the Discovery of Skilled ForecastersPavel Atanasov, Ezra Karger, Philip Tetlock. 1133 [doi]
- To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph ModelRiccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Sophie Klumper, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis. 1134-1154 [doi]
- Competitive Auctions with Imperfect PredictionsPinyan Lu, Zongqi Wan, Jialin Zhang 0001. 1155-1183 [doi]
- Online Mechanism Design with PredictionsEric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan, Cherlin Zhu. 1184 [doi]
- Redistribution through Market SegmentationVictor Augias, Daniel M. A. Barreto, Alexis Ghersengorin. 1185-1186 [doi]
- Optimal Design of Default DonationsFrancisco Castro, Scott Rodilitz. 1187 [doi]
- A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price DiscriminationDirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Michael C. Wang 0003. 1188 [doi]
- Inclusive Recommendations and User Engagement: Experimental Evidence from PinterestMadhav Kumar, Pedro Silva 0010, Ashudeep Singh, Abhay Varmaraja. 1189-1191 [doi]
- Algorithmic vs. Friend-based Recommendations in Shaping Novel Content Engagement: A Large-scale Field ExperimentShan Huang, Yi Ji. 1192 [doi]
- Scars of the Gestapo: Remembrance and Privacy ConcernsSebastián D. Bauer, Florencia M. Hnilo. 1193 [doi]
- Search and RediscoveryMartino Banchio, Suraj Malladi. 1194 [doi]
- Decomposable Stochastic ChoiceFedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz. 1195 [doi]
- Posterior-Mean Separable Costs of Information AcquisitionJeffrey Mensch, Komal Malik. 1196 [doi]
- The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for QualityZihao Li, Jonathan Libgober. 1197 [doi]
- The Core of Bayesian persuasionLaura Doval, Ran Eilat. 1198-1199 [doi]
- Incentivized Exploration via Filtered Posterior SamplingYonatan Gur, Anand Kalvit, Aleksandrs Slivkins. 1200 [doi]
- Persuasion with Ambiguous CommunicationXiaoyu Cheng, Peter Klibanoff, Sujoy Mukerji, Ludovic Renou. 1201-1202 [doi]
- Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric SendersZhicheng Du, Wei Tang, Zihe Wang 0001, Shuo Zhang. 1203 [doi]
- Estimating Treatment Effects under Recommender Interference: A Structured Neural Networks ApproachRuohan Zhan, Shichao Han, Yuchen Hu, Zhenling Jiang. 1204 [doi]
- Forecasting Algorithms for Causal Inference with Panel DataJacob Goldin, Julian Nyarko, Justin Young. 1205 [doi]
- Coarse PersonalizationWalter Zhang, Sanjog Misra. 1206-1208 [doi]
- Minimax-Regret Sample Selection in Randomized ExperimentsYuchen Hu, Henry Zhu, Emma Brunskil, Stefan Wager. 1209-1235 [doi]
- Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive ValuationsMichal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka. 1236-1266 [doi]
- On the Fairness of Normalized $p$-Means for Allocating Goods and ChoresOwen Eckart, Alexandros Psomas 0001, Paritosh Verma. 1267 [doi]
- Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX AllocationsGeorgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alkmini Sgouritsa. 1268-1286 [doi]
- On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive ValuationsGerdus Benade, Daniel Halpern 0002, Alexandros Psomas 0001, Paritosh Verma. 1287 [doi]
- Efficient and Strategy-proof Mechanism under General ConstraintsKenzo Imamura, Yasushi Kawase. 1288 [doi]
- Equilibrium in PseudomarketsThành Nguyen 0001, Alexander Teytelboym. 1289 [doi]
- Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisitedKenzo Imamura, Keisuke Bando, Tomoya Kazumura. 1290 [doi]
- Multi-Criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative StaticsAfshin Nikzad. 1291 [doi]
- Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral HazardJeffrey Ely, George Georgiadis, Luis Rayo. 1292 [doi]
- Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary ActionsFederico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti 0001. 1293 [doi]
- Optimal Robust Contract DesignBo Peng, Zhihao Gavin Tang. 1294 [doi]
- Optimality of Weighted Contracts for Multi-agent Contract Design with a BudgetWade Hann-Caruthers, Sumit Goel. 1295 [doi]