Table of Contents

• Getting to Economic Equilibrium: A Problem and Its HistoryKenneth J. Arrow. 1-2 [doi]
• My Favorite Simplicial Complex and Some of Its ApplicationsHerbert E. Scarf. 3 [doi]
• Markets and the Primal-Dual ParadigmVijay V. Vazirani. 4 [doi]
• The Computation of EquilibriaChristos H. Papadimitriou. 5-6 [doi]
• A Note on Equilibrium Pricing as Convex OptimizationLihua Chen, Yinyu Ye, Jiawei Zhang. 7-16 [doi]
• New Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix GamesHartwig Bosse, Jaroslaw Byrka, Evangelos Markakis. 17-29 [doi]
• A Unified Approach to Congestion Games and Two-Sided MarketsHeiner Ackermann, Paul W. Goldberg, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin, Berthold Vöcking. 30-41 [doi]
• An Optimization Approach for Approximate Nash EquilibriaHaralampos Tsaknakis, Paul G. Spirakis. 42-56 [doi]
• Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form GamesAndrew Gilpin, Samid Hoda, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm. 57-69 [doi]
• Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction MarketsYiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, Rica Gonen. 70-81 [doi]
• Pari-Mutuel Markets: Mechanisms and PerformanceMark Peters, Anthony Man-Cho So, Yinyu Ye. 82-95 [doi]
• Information Sharing CommunitiesGabrielle Demange. 96-107 [doi]
• Competitive Safety Strategies in Position AuctionsDanny Kuminov, Moshe Tennenholtz. 108-118 [doi]
• Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search AuctionsJennifer Wortman, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Lihong Li, John Langford. 119-130 [doi]
• Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based AdvertisingS. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál, Zoya Svitkina. 131-142 [doi]
• Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored SearchZoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh. 143-154 [doi]
• Equilibrium Analysis of Dynamic Bidding in Sponsored Search AuctionsYevgeniy Vorobeychik, Daniel M. Reeves. 155-166 [doi]
• Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search AuctionLi Liang, Qi Qi. 167-178 [doi]
• Cost-Balancing Tolls for Atomic Network Congestion GamesDimitris Fotakis, Paul G. Spirakis. 179-190 [doi]
• Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic DynamicsEsteban Arcaute, Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor. 191-207 [doi]
• Who Should Pay for Forwarding Packets?Heiner Ackermann, Patrick Briest, Alexander Fanghänel, Berthold Vöcking. 208-219 [doi]
• On the Performance of Congestion Games for Optimum Satisfiability ProblemsAristotelis Giannakos, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Vangelis Th. Paschos. 220-231 [doi]
• Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear UtilitiesAlexander Hall, Evdokia Nikolova, Christos H. Papadimitriou. 232-244 [doi]
• False-Name-Proof Mechanisms for Hiring a TeamAtsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahyar Salek, Makoto Yokoo. 245-256 [doi]
• Mechanism Design on Trust NetworksArpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Ryan Fugger. 257-268 [doi]
• Stochastic Mechanism DesignSamuel Ieong, Anthony Man-Cho So, Mukund Sundararajan. 269-280 [doi]
• A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social NetworksEyal Even-Dar, Asaf Shapira. 281-286 [doi]
• A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform InterestsYair Halevi, Yishay Mansour. 287-292 [doi]
• A Theory of Loss-Leaders: Making Money by Pricing Below CostMaria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, T.-H. Hubert Chan, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi. 293-299 [doi]
• PageRank as a Weak Tournament SolutionFelix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer. 300-305 [doi]
• Competitive Influence Maximization in Social NetworksShishir Bharathi, David Kempe, Mahyar Salek. 306-311 [doi]
• Sponsored Search with ContextsEyal Even-Dar, Michael J. Kearns, Jennifer Wortman. 312-317 [doi]
• Capacity Constraints and the Inevitability of Mediators in Adword AuctionsSudhir Kumar Singh, Vwani P. Roychowdhury, Himawan Gunadhi, Behnam Attaran Rezaei. 318-325 [doi]
• Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search AuctionsZoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh, Erik Vee. 326-334 [doi]
• Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation BidsGagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta. 335-340 [doi]
• An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism ::::delta:::: -Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and BudgetRica Gonen, Elan Pavlov. 341-346 [doi]
• Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand CorrespondencesBenton McCune. 347-355 [doi]
• Market Equilibrium Using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute UtilitiesRahul Garg, Sanjiv Kapoor. 356-361 [doi]
• Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher MarketsNimrod Megiddo, Vijay V. Vazirani. 362-367 [doi]
• Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross SubstitutesChinmay Karande, Nikhil R. Devanur. 368-373 [doi]
• On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation MarketsDeeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil R. Devanur. 374-380 [doi]
• Total Latency in Singleton Congestion GamesMartin Gairing, Florian Schoppmann. 381-387 [doi]
• The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution GamesJacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes. 388-395 [doi]
• Secure Relative Performance SchemeKurt Nielsen, Tomas Toft. 396-403 [doi]
• Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs Minimization ProblemStefania Di Giannantonio, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Mordechai Shalom, Shmuel Zaks. 404-411 [doi]
• The Wi-Fi Roaming GameMohammad Hossein Falaki. 412-418 [doi]
• On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific Network Congestion GamesHeiner Ackermann, Alexander Skopalik. 419-430 [doi]
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Globally-Ranked PairsDavid J. Abraham, Ariel Levavi, David Manlove, Gregg O Malley. 431-444 [doi]
• A PSPACE-complete Sperner Triangle GameKyle W. Burke, Shang-Hua Teng. 445-456 [doi]
• Group Dominant StrategiesOla Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz. 457-468 [doi]
• Weighted Boolean Formula GamesMarios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien, Klaus W. Wagner. 469-481 [doi]
• Core Stability of Vertex Cover GamesQizhi Fang, Liang Kong. 482-490 [doi]
• Maximizing Revenue in Sequential AuctionsEdith Elkind, S. Shaheen Fatima. 491-502 [doi]
• Approximate Mechanisms for the Graphical TSP and Other Graph Traversal ProblemsDavide Bilò, Luca Forlizzi, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti. 503-514 [doi]
• To Be or Not to Be (Served)Yvonne Bleischwitz, Burkhard Monien, Florian Schoppmann. 515-528 [doi]
• Ad Auction Design and User ExperienceZoë Abrams, Michael Schwarz. 529-534 [doi]
• Personalized Ad Delivery When Ads Fatigue: An Approximation AlgorithmZoë Abrams, Erik Vee. 535-540 [doi]
• Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored SearchKuzman Ganchev, Alex Kulesza, Jinsong Tan, Ryan Gabbard, Qian Liu, Michael Kearns. 541-548 [doi]
• Pay-per-action Model for Online AdvertisingMohammad Mahdian, Kerem Tomak. 549-557 [doi]
• Public Advertisement Broker MarketsAtish Das Sarma, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Sreenivas Gollapudi. 558-563 [doi]
• K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative ComputationItai Ashlagi, Andrey Klinger, Moshe Tennenholtz. 564-569 [doi]
• Monotone Properties of Randomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible AuctionsAries Wei Sun. 570-575 [doi]
• Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored SearchArpita Ghosh, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Mukund Sundararajan. 576-583 [doi]
• On the Price of Truthfulness in Path AuctionsQiqi Yan. 584-589 [doi]
• Characterizing Truthful Market DesignMira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov. 590-595 [doi]