Abstract is missing.
- Convergent algorithms for collaborative filteringJon M. Kleinberg, Mark Sandler. 1-10 [doi]
- Efficiency through feedback-contingent fees and rewards in auction marketplaces with adverse selection and moral hazardChrysanthos Dellarocas. 11-18 [doi]
- k-ImplementationDov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz. 19-28 [doi]
- Envy-free auctions for digital goodsAndrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline. 29-35 [doi]
- Playing large games using simple strategiesRichard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta. 36-41 [doi]
- Correlated equilibria in graphical gamesSham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, John Langford, Luis E. Ortiz. 42-47 [doi]
- A polynomial-time nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated gamesMichael L. Littman, Peter Stone. 48-54 [doi]
- Agent-based service composition through simultaneous negotiation in forward and reverse auctionsChris Preist, Claudio Bartolini, Andrew Byde. 55-63 [doi]
- Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formationMoshe Babaioff, William E. Walsh. 64-75 [doi]
- On cheating in sealed-bid auctionsRyan Porter, Yoav Shoham. 76-84 [doi]
- A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bidsAtsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kenji Terada. 85-92 [doi]
- On the core of the multicommodity flow gameEvangelos Markakis, Amin Saberi. 93-97 [doi]
- How much can taxes help selfish routing?Richard Cole, Yevgeniy Dodis, Tim Roughgarden. 98-107 [doi]
- Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location gamesNikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vazirani. 108-114 [doi]
- Exploring bidding strategies for market-based schedulingMichael P. Wellman, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Daniel M. Reeves, Sowmya Swaminathan. 115-124 [doi]
- Selling online versus offline: theory and evidences from Sotheby sEiichiro Kazumori. 125-134 [doi]
- Searching dynamically bundled goods with pairwise relationsYuan-Chi Chang, Chung-Sheng Li, John R. Smith. 135-143 [doi]
- Betting boolean-style: a framework for trading in securities based on logical formulasLance Fortnow, Joe Kilian, David M. Pennock, Michael P. Wellman. 144-155 [doi]
- Computation in a distributed information marketJoan Feigenbaum, Lance Fortnow, David M. Pennock, Rahul Sami. 156-165 [doi]
- Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctionsAnshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri. 166-175 [doi]
- On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queriesMartin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm. 176-185 [doi]
- Multi-attribute exchange market: representation and indexing of ordersEugene Fink, Josh Johnson, John Hershberger 0002. 186-187 [doi]
- Pricing and QoS of information services in a competitive market (extended abstract)Zhen Liu, Laura Wynter, Cathy H. Xia. 188-189 [doi]
- Profit guaranteeing mechanisms for multicast networksShuchi Chawla, D. Kitchin, Uday Rajan, R. Ravi, Amitabh Sinha. 190-191 [doi]
- Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism designAndrew Byde. 192-193 [doi]
- Budget balanced mechanisms for the multicast pricing problem with ratesMarkus Bläser, Bodo Manthey. 194-195 [doi]
- Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctionsWolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm. 196-197 [doi]
- AutONA: a system for automated multiple 1-1 negotiationAndrew Byde, Michael Yearworth, Kay-Yut Chen, Claudio Bartolini, Nir Vulkan. 198-199 [doi]
- Intermediaries in an electronic trade networkFloortje Alkemade, Johannes A. La Poutré, Hans Amman. 200-201 [doi]
- Extensions of the spending constraint-model: existence and uniqueness of equilibria (extended abstract)Nikhil R. Devanur, Vijay V. Vazirani. 202-203 [doi]
- An agent-based framework for dynamic multi-period continuous double auctions in B2B exchangesLi Li, Stephen F. Smith. 204-205 [doi]
- Combinatorial auction across independent markets (extended abstract)Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Hong Zhu. 206-207 [doi]
- A strategic decision model for multi-attribute bilateral negotiation with alternatingCuihong Li, Gerald Tesauro. 208-209 [doi]
- Certifying data from multiple sources (extended abstract)Glen Nuckolls, Charles U. Martel, Stuart G. Stubblebine. 210-211 [doi]
- Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiencyAnton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm. 212-213 [doi]
- Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctionsAditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes. 214-215 [doi]
- Price prediction in a trading agent competition (extended abstract)Michael P. Wellman, Daniel M. Reeves, Kevin M. Lochner. 216-217 [doi]
- Profit-maximizing multicast pricing by approximating fixed pointsAranyak Mehta, Scott Shenker, Vijay V. Vazirani. 218-219 [doi]
- Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism designFelix Brandt. 220-221 [doi]
- A performance model for a BPI middlewareTe-Kai Liu, Amir Behroozi, Santhosh Kumaran. 222-223 [doi]
- Multi-agent implementation of asymmetric protocol for bilateral negotiationsJames E. Hanson, Gerald Tesauro, Jeffrey O. Kephart, E. C. Snibl. 224-225 [doi]
- Using value queries in combinatorial auctionsBenoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm. 226-227 [doi]
- A reputation-based trust model for peer-to-peer ecommerce communitiesLi Xiong, Ling Liu. 228-229 [doi]
- Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the coreVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 230-231 [doi]
- Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designerVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 232-233 [doi]
- Collaboration software to reduce inventory and increase responseIndu Bingham, Barbara Hoefle, Kim Phan, Jim Sizemore, Arthur M. Keller. 234-235 [doi]
- Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bidsAnshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri. 236-237 [doi]
- Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocationChaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer. 238-239 [doi]
- Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism designEric J. Friedman, David C. Parkes. 240-241 [doi]
- Computing the outcome of proxy bidding in combinatorial auctions extended abstractPeter R. Wurman, Gangshu Cai, Ashish Sureka. 242-243 [doi]
- Dynamic supply chain formation: integrating multi-attribute auctions and finite capacity schedulingJiong Sun, Norman M. Sadeh. 244-245 [doi]
- Reputation rating system based on past behavior of evaluatorsKo Fujimura, Takuo Nishihara. 246-247 [doi]
- Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugalityRahul Garg, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, Akshat Verma. 248-249 [doi]
- End-user tools for debugging e-commerceHenry Lieberman, Earl Wagner. 250-251 [doi]
- Improving learning performance by applying economic knowledgeChristopher H. Brooks, Robert S. Gazzale, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Edmund H. Durfee. 252-253 [doi]
- A nonoparametric estimator for setting: reserve prices in procurement auctionsMartin Bichler, Jayant Kalagnanam. 254-255 [doi]
- Polyhedral sampling for multiattribute preference elicitationSoumyadip Ghosh, Jayant Kalagnanam. 256-257 [doi]
- Information incorporation in online in-Game sports betting marketsSandip Debnath, David M. Pennock, C. Lee Giles, Steve Lawrence. 258-259 [doi]
- Tracking results from multichannel marketing programs on electronic commerceThomas Kwok, Thao Nguyen, Linh Lam. 260-261 [doi]
- Identity-based confirmer signatures from pairings over elliptic curvesSong Han, Winson K. Y. Yeung, Jie Wang. 262-263 [doi]
- Storage allocation in web prefetching techniquesDaniel Dajun Zeng, Fei-Yue Wang, Sudha Ram. 264-265 [doi]
- Semantic and syntactic interoperability: in transactional systemsChito Jovellanos. 266-267 [doi]
- A semantic web environment for context-aware m-commerceNorman M. Sadeh, Ting-Chak Chan, Linh Van, Oh Byung Kwon, Kazuaki Takizawa. 268-269 [doi]
- Effects of information feedback loops on supply chain performanceAmitava Dutta, Rahul Roy. 270-271 [doi]
- The policy analysis market: an electronic commerce application of a combinatorial information marketCharles Polk, Robin Hanson, John O. Ledyard, Takashi Ishikida. 272-273 [doi]
- The digital signage exchange: a virtual marketplace for out-of-home digital advertisingJohn V. Harrison, Anna Andrusiewicz. 274 [doi]
- Baby bond connect: software for combined value tradingJohn O. Ledyard, John C. Lin. 275 [doi]
- Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementationsJeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes. 276-277 [doi]
- Incentive compatible open constraint optimizationBoi Faltings. 278-279 [doi]
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharingJoan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami, Scott Shenker. 280 [doi]