Abstract is missing.
- Ironing in the DarkTim Roughgarden, Okke Schrijvers. 1-18 [doi]
- A/B Testing of AuctionsShuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov. 19-20 [doi]
- The FedEx ProblemAmos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin, Elias Koutsoupias. 21-22 [doi]
- Descending Price Optimally Coordinates SearchRobert D. Kleinberg, Bo Waggoner, E. Glen Weyl. 23-24 [doi]
- Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney ExchangeJohn P. Dickerson, David F. Manlove, Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm, James Trimble. 25-42 [doi]
- The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few QueriesSepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li. 43-60 [doi]
- Cadet-Branch Matching in a Quasi-Linear Labor MarketRavi Jagadeesan. 61-62 [doi]
- Virtual Demand and Stable MechanismsJan Christoph Schlegel. 63 [doi]
- Deferred Acceptance with Compensation ChainsPiotr Dworczak. 65-66 [doi]
- Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?Ya'akov (Kobi) Gal, Moshe Mash, Ariel D. Procaccia, Yair Zick. 67-84 [doi]
- The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting CostsAndrew Kephart, Vincent Conitzer. 85-102 [doi]
- Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated ItemsPingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang. 103-120 [doi]
- Strategic Ironing in Pay-as-Bid Auctions: Equilibrium Existence with Private InformationKyle Woodward. 121 [doi]
- Pay-as-Bid: Selling Divisible GoodsMarek Pycia, Kyle Woodward. 123 [doi]
- When Should an Expert Make a Prediction?Yossi Azar, Amir Ban, Yishay Mansour. 125-142 [doi]
- The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction MarketsRachel Cummings, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. 143-160 [doi]
- Arbitrage-Free Combinatorial Market Making via Integer ProgrammingChristian Kroer, Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, Sivaraman Balakrishnan. 161-178 [doi]
- Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer PredictionVictor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes. 179-196 [doi]
- Optimal Commitments in Asymmetric Auctions with Incomplete InformationPingzhong Tang, Zihe Wang, Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang. 197-211 [doi]
- Sequential Mechanisms with Ex-post Participation GuaranteesItai Ashlagi, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nima Haghpanah. 213-214 [doi]
- Optimal Auctions with Restricted AllocationsIan A. Kash, Rafael M. Frongillo. 215-232 [doi]
- Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Christos Tzamos. 233-250 [doi]
- Simple Mechanisms for Agents with ComplementsMichal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner. 251-267 [doi]
- On Voting and Facility LocationMichal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Iddan Golomb. 269-286 [doi]
- Towards Large-Scale Deliberative Decision-Making: Small Groups and the Importance of TriadsAshish Goel, David Timothy Lee. 287-303 [doi]
- The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash WelfareIoannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé C. Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah 0001, Junxing Wang. 305-322 [doi]
- How Effective Can Simple Ordinal Peer Grading Be?Ioannis Caragiannis, George A. Krimpas, Alexandros A. Voudouris. 323-340 [doi]
- Assortment Optimization under a Random Swap based Distribution over Permutations ModelAntoine Désir, Vineet Goyal, Danny Segev. 341-342 [doi]
- Planning Problems for Sophisticated Agents with Present BiasJon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Manish Raghavan. 343-360 [doi]
- Procrastination with Variable Present BiasNick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis. 361 [doi]
- A Dynamic Model of CrowdfundingSaeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Mohamed Mostagir. 363 [doi]
- Blockchain Mining GamesAggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Maria Kyropoulou, Yiannis Tselekounis. 365-382 [doi]
- The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market PricingVincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat. 383-400 [doi]
- Lottery Pricing EquilibriaShaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi. 401-418 [doi]
- Online Budgeted Allocation with General BudgetsNathaniel Kell, Debmalya Panigrahi. 419-436 [doi]
- Matroid Online Bipartite Matching and Vertex CoverYajun Wang, Sam Chiu-wai Wong. 437-454 [doi]
- Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Pricing and Flexible Work on the Uber PlatformM. Keith Chen. 455 [doi]
- Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy: Abstract of the Kalai Prize TalkTim Roughgarden. 457 [doi]
- Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Bounds in GamesChristian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm. 459-476 [doi]
- A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection GamesYannai A. Gonczarowski, Moshe Tennenholtz. 477 [doi]
- Hardness Results for Signaling in Bayesian Zero-Sum and Network Routing GamesUmang Bhaskar, Yu Cheng, Young Kun-Ko, Chaitanya Swamy. 479-496 [doi]
- The Mysteries of Security Games: Equilibrium Computation Becomes Combinatorial Algorithm DesignHaifeng Xu. 497-514 [doi]
- The Seasonality Of Paid Search Effectiveness From A Long Running Field TestQuinn Ye, Saarthak Malik, Ji Chen, Haijun Zhu. 515-530 [doi]
- Returns to Consumer Search: Evidence from eBayThomas Blake, Chris Nosko, Steven Tadelis. 531-545 [doi]
- The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Cooperative Decision-Making can be Predicted with high Accuracy when using only Three Behavioral TypesZiv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich, David G. Rand. 547-559 [doi]
- Understanding Emerging Threats to Online AdvertisingCeren Budak, Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao, Georgios Zervas. 561-578 [doi]
- Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante RelaxationShuchi Chawla, J. Benjamin Miller. 579-596 [doi]
- Where to Sell: Simulating Auctions From Learning AlgorithmsHamid Nazerzadeh, Renato Paes Leme, Afshin Rostamizadeh, Umar Syed. 597-598 [doi]
- A Near-Optimal Exploration-Exploitation Approach for Assortment SelectionShipra Agrawal, Vashist Avadhanula, Vineet Goyal, Assaf Zeevi. 599-600 [doi]
- Minimizing Regret with Multiple ReservesTim Roughgarden, Joshua R. Wang. 601-616 [doi]
- General Threshold Model for Social Cascades: Analysis and SimulationsJie Gao, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh, Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu. 617-634 [doi]
- Impact of Community Structure on CascadesMehrdad Moharrami, Vijay Subramanian, Mingyan Liu, Marc Lelarge. 635-636 [doi]
- Dynamics of Evolving Social GroupsNoga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz. 637-654 [doi]
- Dynamic Conflict on a NetworkMarcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal, David E. N. Minarsch. 655-656 [doi]
- Pricing with Limited Knowledge of DemandMaxime C. Cohen, Georgia Perakis, Robert S. Pindyck. 657 [doi]
- The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium ModelsRachel Cummings, Katrina Ligett, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth. 659 [doi]
- Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian GamesYishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Zhiwei Steven Wu. 661 [doi]
- Persuasion with Limited CommunicationShaddin Dughmi, David Kempe, Ruixin Qiang. 663-680 [doi]
- Computational Extensive-Form GamesJoseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman. 681-698 [doi]
- Ascending-Price Algorithms for Unknown MarketsXiaohui Bei, Jugal Garg, Martin Hoefer. 699 [doi]
- Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow ApproachOzan Candogan, Markos Epitropou, Rakesh V. Vohra. 701-702 [doi]
- Average Case Performance of Replicator Dynamics in Potential Games via Computing Regions of AttractionIoannis Panageas, Georgios Piliouras. 703-720 [doi]
- Strategic Payment Routing in Financial Credit NetworksFrank Cheng, Junming Liu, Kareem Amin, Michael P. Wellman. 721-738 [doi]
- Sybil Detection Using Latent Network StructureGrant Schoenebeck, Aaron Snook, Fang-Yi Yu. 739-756 [doi]
- Economic Recommendation Systems: One Page AbstractGal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz. 757 [doi]
- Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps [Extended Abstract]Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston. 759 [doi]
- Petty Envy When Assigning ObjectsThayer Morrill. 761 [doi]
- "Strategic" Behavior in a Strategy-proof EnvironmentAvinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer. 763-764 [doi]
- On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic MarketsItai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi. 765 [doi]
- What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings?: How Competition Guides DesignItai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad. 767-768 [doi]
- The Pareto Frontier for Random MechanismsTimo Mennle, Sven Seuken. 769 [doi]
- Mechanism Design with Selective VerificationDimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos, Manolis Zampetakis. 771-788 [doi]
- Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel MechanismsJoosung Lee. 789-790 [doi]
- Large Market Games with Near Optimal EfficiencyRichard Cole 0001, Yixin Tao. 791-808 [doi]
- Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Combinatorial AuctionsJacob D. Abernethy, Sébastien Lahaie, Matus Telgarsky. 809 [doi]
- On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic CustomersYiwei Chen, Vivek F. Farias. 811 [doi]
- Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position AuctionsPaul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes. 813 [doi]
- Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited CommitmentSantiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Y. Weintraub. 815 [doi]
- Feature-based Dynamic PricingMaxime C. Cohen, Ilan Lobel, Renato Paes Leme. 817 [doi]
- Fair Resource Allocation in A Volatile MarketplaceMohammad Hossein Bateni, Yiwei Chen, Dragos Florin Ciocan, Vahab S. Mirrokni. 819 [doi]
- Revealed Preference at Scale: Learning Personalized Preferences from Assortment ChoicesNathan Kallus, Madeleine Udell. 821-837 [doi]
- Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion GamesVittorio Bilò, Cosimo Vinci. 839-856 [doi]