On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis. On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives. In Nikhil R. Devanur, Pinyan Lu, editors, Web and Internet Economics - 13th International Conference, WINE 2017, Bangalore, India, December 17-20, 2017, Proceedings. Volume 10660 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1-15, Springer, 2017. [doi]

@inproceedings{AmanatidisBM17,
  title = {On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives},
  author = {Georgios Amanatidis and Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_1},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/AmanatidisBM17},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {1-15},
  booktitle = {Web and Internet Economics - 13th International Conference, WINE 2017, Bangalore, India, December 17-20, 2017, Proceedings},
  editor = {Nikhil R. Devanur and Pinyan Lu},
  volume = {10660},
  series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  publisher = {Springer},
  isbn = {978-3-319-71924-5},
}