Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents

Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper, Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer, Artem Tsikiridis. Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents. In Jugal Garg, Max Klimm, Yuqing Kong, editors, Web and Internet Economics - 19th International Conference, WINE 2023, Shanghai, China, December 4-8, 2023, Proceedings. Volume 14413 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 41-58, Springer, 2023. [doi]

@inproceedings{AmanatidisKMST23,
  title = {Partial Allocations in Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design: Bridging Multiple Levels of Service and Divisible Agents},
  author = {Georgios Amanatidis and Sophie Klumper and Evangelos Markakis and Guido Schäfer and Artem Tsikiridis},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_3},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_3},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/AmanatidisKMST23},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {41-58},
  booktitle = {Web and Internet Economics - 19th International Conference, WINE 2023, Shanghai, China, December 4-8, 2023, Proceedings},
  editor = {Jugal Garg and Max Klimm and Yuqing Kong},
  volume = {14413},
  series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  publisher = {Springer},
  isbn = {978-3-031-48974-7},
}