Sepehr Assadi, Sahil Singla 0001. Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders. In David Zuckerman, editor, 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2019, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, November 9-12, 2019. pages 233-248, IEEE Computer Society, 2019. [doi]
@inproceedings{Assadi019,
title = {Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders},
author = {Sepehr Assadi and Sahil Singla 0001},
year = {2019},
doi = {10.1109/FOCS.2019.00024},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2019.00024},
researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/Assadi019},
cites = {0},
citedby = {0},
pages = {233-248},
booktitle = {60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2019, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, November 9-12, 2019},
editor = {David Zuckerman},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
isbn = {978-1-7281-4952-3},
}