Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment

Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Y. Weintraub. Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment. In Vincent Conitzer, Dirk Bergemann, Yiling Chen, editors, Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '16, Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 24-28, 2016. pages 815, ACM, 2016. [doi]

@inproceedings{BalseiroBW16,
  title = {Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment},
  author = {Santiago R. Balseiro and Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1145/2940716.2940732},
  url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2940716.2940732},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/BalseiroBW16},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {815},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '16, Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 24-28, 2016},
  editor = {Vincent Conitzer and Dirk Bergemann and Yiling Chen},
  publisher = {ACM},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-3936-0},
}