Limits on the Social Welfare of Maximal-In-Range Auction Mechanisms

David Buchfuhrer, Christopher Umans. Limits on the Social Welfare of Maximal-In-Range Auction Mechanisms. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 16:68, 2009. [doi]

@article{BuchfuhrerU09,
  title = {Limits on the Social Welfare of Maximal-In-Range Auction Mechanisms},
  author = {David Buchfuhrer and Christopher Umans},
  year = {2009},
  url = {http://eccc.hpi-web.de/report/2009/068},
  tags = {social},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/BuchfuhrerU09},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  journal = {Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC)},
  volume = {16},
  pages = {68},
}