Last Round Convergence and No-Dynamic Regret in Asymmetric Repeated Games

Le Cong Dinh, Tri-Dung Nguyen, Alain B. Zemkoho, Long Tran-Thanh. Last Round Convergence and No-Dynamic Regret in Asymmetric Repeated Games. In Vitaly Feldman, Katrina Ligett, Sivan Sabato, editors, Algorithmic Learning Theory, 16-19 March 2021, Virtual Conference, Worldwide. Volume 132 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 553-577, PMLR, 2021. [doi]

@inproceedings{DinhNZT21,
  title = {Last Round Convergence and No-Dynamic Regret in Asymmetric Repeated Games},
  author = {Le Cong Dinh and Tri-Dung Nguyen and Alain B. Zemkoho and Long Tran-Thanh},
  year = {2021},
  url = {http://proceedings.mlr.press/v132/dinh21a.html},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/DinhNZT21},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {553-577},
  booktitle = {Algorithmic Learning Theory, 16-19 March 2021, Virtual Conference, Worldwide},
  editor = {Vitaly Feldman and Katrina Ligett and Sivan Sabato},
  volume = {132},
  series = {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research},
  publisher = {PMLR},
}