Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory

David Easley, Arpita Ghosh. Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory. In Tim Roughgarden, Michal Feldman, Michael Schwarz, editors, Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '15, Portland, OR, USA, June 15-19, 2015. pages 679-696, ACM, 2015. [doi]

@inproceedings{EasleyG15,
  title = {Behavioral Mechanism Design: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contracts and Prospect Theory},
  author = {David Easley and Arpita Ghosh},
  year = {2015},
  doi = {10.1145/2764468.2764513},
  url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2764468.2764513},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/EasleyG15},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {679-696},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '15, Portland, OR, USA, June 15-19, 2015},
  editor = {Tim Roughgarden and Michal Feldman and Michael Schwarz},
  publisher = {ACM},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-3410-5},
}