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Masahiro Goto, Naoyuki Hashimoto, Atsushi Iwasaki, Yujiro Kawasaki, Suguru Ueda, Yosuke Yasuda, Makoto Yokoo. Strategy-proof matching with regional minimum quotas. In Ana L. C. Bazzan, Michael N. Huhns, Alessio Lomuscio, Paul Scerri, editors, International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS '14, Paris, France, May 5-9, 2014. pages 1225-1232, IFAAMAS/ACM, 2014. [doi]

The following publications are possibly variants of this publication:

Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotasMasahiro Goto, Atsushi Iwasaki, Yujiro Kawasaki, Ryoji Kurata, Yosuke Yasuda, Makoto Yokoo. ai, 235:40-57, 2016. [doi]

Strategy-proof mechanisms for two-sided matching with minimum and maximum quotasSuguru Ueda, Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Makoto Yokoo. atal 2012: 1327-1328 [doi]

Improving Fairness in Nonwasteful Matching with Hierarchical Regional Minimum QuotasMasahiro Goto, Ryoji Kurata, Naoto Hamada, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo. atal 2015: 1887-1888 [doi]

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum QuotasDaniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo. teco, 4(1):6, 2015. [doi]

Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowmentsNaoto Hamada, Chia-ling Hsu, Ryoji Kurata, Takamasa Suzuki, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo. ai, 249:47-71, 2017. [doi]

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas and Initial Endowments: (Extended Abstract)Naoto Hamada, Ryoji Kurata, Suguru Ueda, Takamasa Suzuki, Makoto Yokoo. atal 2016: 1349-1350 [doi]

Pareto Efficient Strategy-proof School Choice Mechanism with Minimum Quotas and Initial EndowmentsRyoji Kurata, Naoto Hamada, Chia-ling Hsu, Takamasa Suzuki, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo. atal 2016: 59-67 [doi]

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