Nash-Bargaining-Based Models for Matching Markets: One-Sided and Two-Sided; Fisher and Arrow-Debreu

Mojtaba Hosseini, Vijay V. Vazirani. Nash-Bargaining-Based Models for Matching Markets: One-Sided and Two-Sided; Fisher and Arrow-Debreu. In Mark Braverman, editor, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS 2022, January 31 - February 3, 2022, Berkeley, CA, USA. Volume 215 of LIPIcs, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2022. [doi]

Authors

Mojtaba Hosseini

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Vijay V. Vazirani

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