Are Security Experts Useful? Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Network Security Games with Limited Information

Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags, Nicolas Christin, John Chuang. Are Security Experts Useful? Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Network Security Games with Limited Information. In Dimitris Gritzalis, Bart Preneel, Marianthi Theoharidou, editors, Computer Security - ESORICS 2010, 15th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Athens, Greece, September 20-22, 2010. Proceedings. Volume 6345 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 588-606, Springer, 2010. [doi]

@inproceedings{JohnsonGCC10,
  title = {Are Security Experts Useful? Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Network Security Games with Limited Information},
  author = {Benjamin Johnson and Jens Grossklags and Nicolas Christin and John Chuang},
  year = {2010},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_36},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_36},
  tags = {security},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/JohnsonGCC10},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {588-606},
  booktitle = {Computer Security - ESORICS 2010, 15th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Athens, Greece, September 20-22, 2010. Proceedings},
  editor = {Dimitris Gritzalis and Bart Preneel and Marianthi Theoharidou},
  volume = {6345},
  series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  publisher = {Springer},
  isbn = {978-3-642-15496-6},
}