Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates

Jean-François Laslier, Karine Van der Straeten. Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates. Social Choice and Welfare, 47(3):559-587, 2016. [doi]

@article{LaslierS16,
  title = {Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates},
  author = {Jean-François Laslier and Karine Van der Straeten},
  year = {2016},
  doi = {10.1007/s00355-016-0983-y},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0983-y},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/LaslierS16},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  volume = {47},
  number = {3},
  pages = {559-587},
}