Using Signaling Games to Model the Multi-step Attack-Defense Scenarios on Confidentiality

Jingqiang Lin, Peng Liu 0005, Jiwu Jing. Using Signaling Games to Model the Multi-step Attack-Defense Scenarios on Confidentiality. In Jens Grossklags, Jean C. Walrand, editors, Decision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012. Proceedings. Volume 7638 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 118-137, Springer, 2012. [doi]

@inproceedings{LinLJ12,
  title = {Using Signaling Games to Model the Multi-step Attack-Defense Scenarios on Confidentiality},
  author = {Jingqiang Lin and Peng Liu 0005 and Jiwu Jing},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_7},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_7},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/LinLJ12},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {118-137},
  booktitle = {Decision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012. Proceedings},
  editor = {Jens Grossklags and Jean C. Walrand},
  volume = {7638},
  series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  publisher = {Springer},
  isbn = {978-3-642-34265-3},
}