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- A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing marketsShuang Chen, Min Liu, Xiao Chen. comcom, 81:31-42, 2016. [doi]
- Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Budget-Constrained Online User Selection in Mobile CrowdsensingEn Wang, Hengzhi Wang, Yongjian Yang, Wenbin Liu. tmc, 21(12):4642-4655, 2022. [doi]
- Two-sided Auctions with Budgets: Fairness, Incentives and EfficiencyXiang Liu, Weiwei Wu 0001, Minming Li, Wanyuan Wang. atal 2020: 1907-1909 [doi]
- Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensingXiang Liu, Weiwei Wu 0001, Wanyuan Wang, Yuhang Xu, Xiumin Wang, Helei Cui. TCS, 970:113978, August 2023. [doi]
- Budget-Feasible Sybil-Proof Mechanisms for CrowdsensingXiang Liu, Weiwei Wu 0001, Wanyuan Wang, Yuhang Xu, Xiumin Wang, Helei Cui. faw 2022: 269-288 [doi]