Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

Matthias Messner, Mattias Polborn. Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule. Int. J. Game Theory, 35(2):287-314, 2007. [doi]

@article{MessnerP07,
  title = {Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule},
  author = {Matthias Messner and Mattias Polborn},
  year = {2007},
  doi = {10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/MessnerP07},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  journal = {Int. J. Game Theory},
  volume = {35},
  number = {2},
  pages = {287-314},
}