Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives

H. Reiju Mihara. Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives. Social Choice and Welfare, 17(3):393-402, 2000. [doi]

@article{Mihara00,
  title = {Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives},
  author = {H. Reiju Mihara},
  year = {2000},
  doi = {10.1007/s003550050170},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050170},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/Mihara00},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  journal = {Social Choice and Welfare},
  volume = {17},
  number = {3},
  pages = {393-402},
}