A simple "market value" bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems

Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman, Leonard Ray. A simple "market value" bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems. Int. J. Game Theory, 35(1):111-128, 2006. [doi]

Authors

Guillermo Owen

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Ines Lindner

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Scott L. Feld

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Bernard Grofman

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Leonard Ray

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