Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity - researchr publication authors

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Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Kevin Leyton-Brown. Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity. In Claire Mathieu, editor, Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2009, New York, NY, USA, January 4-6, 2009. pages 738-747, SIAM, 2009. [doi]

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