Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation

Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin. Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. In Peyman Faratin, David C. Parkes, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, William E. Walsh, editors, Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2003 Workshop, AMEC 2003, Melbourne, Australia, July 15, 2003, Revised Selected Papers. Volume 3048 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 73-91, Springer, 2003. [doi]

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