Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation

Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin. Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. In Hideyuki Nakashima, Michael P. Wellman, Gerhard Weiss, Peter Stone, editors, 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006), Hakodate, Japan, May 8-12, 2006. pages 1127-1134, ACM, 2006. [doi]

@inproceedings{SandholmG06,
  title = {Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation},
  author = {Tuomas Sandholm and Andrew Gilpin},
  year = {2006},
  doi = {10.1145/1160633.1160839},
  url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1160633.1160839},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/SandholmG06},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {1127-1134},
  booktitle = {5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006), Hakodate, Japan, May 8-12, 2006},
  editor = {Hideyuki Nakashima and Michael P. Wellman and Gerhard Weiss and Peter Stone},
  publisher = {ACM},
  isbn = {1-59593-303-4},
}