Catherine J. Weinberger. Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game. Games and Economic Behavior, 31(2):262-293, 2000. [doi]
@article{Weinberger00,
title = {Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game},
author = {Catherine J. Weinberger},
year = {2000},
doi = {10.1006/game.1999.0742},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0742},
researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/Weinberger00},
cites = {0},
citedby = {0},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
volume = {31},
number = {2},
pages = {262-293},
}