Quantitative Extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Strategic Agents

Lirong Xia. Quantitative Extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Strategic Agents. In Dale Schuurmans, Michael P. Wellman, editors, Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, February 12-17, 2016, Phoenix, Arizona, USA. pages 644-650, AAAI Press, 2016. [doi]

@inproceedings{Xia16-0,
  title = {Quantitative Extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Strategic Agents},
  author = {Lirong Xia},
  year = {2016},
  url = {http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI16/paper/view/12295},
  researchr = {https://researchr.org/publication/Xia16-0},
  cites = {0},
  citedby = {0},
  pages = {644-650},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, February 12-17, 2016, Phoenix, Arizona, USA},
  editor = {Dale Schuurmans and Michael P. Wellman},
  publisher = {AAAI Press},
}