The following publications are possibly variants of this publication:
- On Designing Strategy-Proof Budget Feasible Online Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing With Time-Discounting ValuesZhenzhe Zheng, Shuo Yang 0001, Jiapeng Xie, Fan Wu 0006, Xiaofeng Gao, Guihai Chen. tmc, 21(6):2088-2102, 2022. [doi]
- A Strategy-Proof Online Auction with Time Discounting ValuesFan Wu, Junming Liu, Zhenzhe Zheng, Guihai Chen. AAAI 2014: 812-818 [doi]
- A Budget Feasible Incentive Mechanism for Weighted Coverage Maximization in Mobile CrowdsensingZhenzhe Zheng, Fan Wu, Xiaofeng Gao, Hongzi Zhu, ShaoJie Tang, Guihai Chen. tmc, 16(9):2392-2407, 2017. [doi]
- Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Budget-Constrained Online User Selection in Mobile CrowdsensingEn Wang, Hengzhi Wang, Yongjian Yang, Wenbin Liu. tmc, 21(12):4642-4655, 2022. [doi]
- Sybil-Proof Online Incentive Mechanisms for CrowdsensingJian Lin, Ming Li, Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue. infocom 2018: 2438-2446 [doi]
- Budget Feasible Mechanisms for DealersHau Chan, Jing Chen. atal 2016: 113-122 [doi]