| 179 | -- | 181 | Pietro Carlo Cacciabue, Yushi Fujita, Kazuo Furuta, Erik Hollnagel. The Rational Choice Of "Error" |
| 182 | -- | 203 | Kazuo Furuta, Kunihide Sasou, Ryuji Kubota, Hiroshi Ujita, Y. Shuto, E. Yagi. Human Factor Analysis of JCO Criticality Accident |
| 204 | -- | 205 | C. Bieder. Comments on the JCO Accident |
| 206 | -- | 208 | Harold Blackman, David Gertman, Bruce Hallbert. The Need for Organisational Analysis |
| 209 | -- | 211 | Pietro Carlo Cacciabue. Comments on the HF Analysis of the JCO Criticality Accident |
| 212 | -- | 214 | Yushi Fujita. Actualities Need to be Captured |
| 215 | -- | 217 | A. R. Hale. The Tokai-mura Accident |
| 218 | -- | 220 | F. Harrison, T. Taylor. Observations Made Regarding the JCO Criticality Accident at Tokai-mura, Japan |
| 221 | -- | 223 | Erik Hollnagel. When All Things Fail |
| 224 | -- | 226 | Akinori Komatsubara. The JCO Accident Caused by Japanese Culture |
| 227 | -- | 229 | Najrnedin Meshkati, Joseph Deato. Commentary on 'Human Factor Analysis of JCO Criticality Accident' by Furuta et al |
| 230 | -- | 231 | James Reason. Human Factor Analysis of JCO Criticality Accident: A Comment on the Analytical Models |
| 232 | -- | 234 | Gene I. Rochlin. A Rational Choice of Error: Comments on the JCO Accident Report |
| 235 | -- | 237 | Makoto Takahashi, Masaharu Kitamura. Risk Awareness as the Crucial Common Factor for Causal Analysis and Remedial Action Synthesis |
| 238 | -- | 239 | F. Tanabe. Functional Structure, Constraints and Mental Model |
| 240 | -- | 241 | Ron Westrum. Safety Planning and Safety Culture in the JCO Criticality Accident: Interpretive Comments |
| 242 | -- | 245 | David D. Woods, Lawrence G. Shattuck. Distant Supervision-Local Action Given the Potential for Surprise |