| 195 | -- | 216 | Dilip Abreu, Rajiv Sethi. Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining |
| 217 | -- | 226 | Michael R. Baye, Heidrun C. Hoppe. The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games |
| 227 | -- | 250 | Elchanan Ben-Porath, Michael Kahneman. Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring |
| 251 | -- | 271 | Lawrence E. Blume. How noise matters |
| 272 | -- | 285 | Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz. The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly |
| 286 | -- | 310 | Kfir Eliaz. Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts |
| 311 | -- | 331 | Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels. Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game |
| 332 | -- | 342 | Larry Samuelson, Jeroen M. Swinkels. Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences |
| 343 | -- | 378 | William H. Sandholm. Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information |
| 379 | -- | 389 | Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Koji Takamiya. The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium |
| 390 | -- | 411 | Doron Sonsino, Julia Sirota. Strategic pattern recognition - experimental evidence |
| 412 | -- | 427 | Juan J. Vidal-Puga, Gustavo Bergantiños. An implementation of the Owen value |