| 1 | -- | 22 | Abhijit Banerjee, Drew Fudenberg. Word-of-mouth learning |
| 23 | -- | 40 | Anthony Burton, Martin Sefton. Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium |
| 41 | -- | 54 | Francesco De Sinopoli. A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy |
| 55 | -- | 75 | Amrita Dhillon, Ben Lockwood. When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? |
| 76 | -- | 87 | Özgür Kibris. Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining |
| 88 | -- | 114 | Wojciech Olszewski. Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods |
| 115 | -- | 128 | Christopher Phelan. On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment |
| 129 | -- | 142 | Zvi Safra, Dov Samet. An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players |
| 143 | -- | 173 | Amparo Urbano, José E. Vila. Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring |
| 174 | -- | 188 | Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara. The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions |
| 189 | -- | 198 | Yoram Halevy. The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents |
| 199 | -- | 212 | Marilda Sotomayor. Implementation in the many-to-many matching market |
| 213 | -- | 214 | Itzhak Gilboa. Honor, Symbols, and War: By Barry O'Neill, University of Michigan Press, 1999 |
| 215 | -- | 218 | Barry O'Neill. Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 3: Edited by Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, Elsevier, New York, 2002 |
| 219 | -- | 0 | Sanjeev Goyal, Sumit Joshi. Erratum to "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly": [Games Econ. Behavior 43 (1) (2003) 57-85] |