| 1 | -- | 35 | Nabil I. Al-Najjar. Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies |
| 36 | -- | 71 | Aaron Archer, Joan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami, Scott Shenker. Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing |
| 72 | -- | 86 | Bogaçhan Çelen, Shachar Kariv. Observational learning under imperfect information |
| 87 | -- | 103 | Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer. Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions |
| 104 | -- | 123 | Ron Holzman, Noa E. Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz. Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions |
| 124 | -- | 156 | Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala. Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals |
| 157 | -- | 171 | Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky. Belief-based equilibrium |
| 172 | -- | 199 | Eilon Solan, Leeat Yariv. Games with espionage |
| 200 | -- | 220 | Ran Spiegler. Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game |
| 221 | -- | 233 | William Stanford. Individually rational pure strategies in large games |