Journal: Games and Economic Behavior

Volume 61, Issue 2

179 -- 197Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon Weidenholzer. Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions
198 -- 224Michael R. Caputo. The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games
225 -- 241Sidartha Gordon. Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo
242 -- 258Isa Emin Hafalir. Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
259 -- 276Luis R. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Nicholas Mark Gotts, Gary Polhill. Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games
277 -- 298László Á. Kóczy, Luc Lauwers. The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
299 -- 315Yi-Chun Chen, Ngo Van Long, Xiao Luo. Iterated strict dominance in general games
316 -- 330Mihai Manea. Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
331 -- 343Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme. Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
344 -- 358Rudolf Müller, Andrés Perea, Sascha Wolf. Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
359 -- 0Yongsheng Xu, Naoki Yoshihara. Corrigendum to "Alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems" [Games Econ. Behav. 57(2006) 86-92]

Volume 61, Issue 1

1 -- 26Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Vincent Iehlé. Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
27 -- 49Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Satoru Takahashi. Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
50 -- 66Arkadi Predtetchinski. The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
67 -- 85Timothy C. Salmon, Michael Iachini. Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions
86 -- 112Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, Marc Vorsatz. An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
113 -- 130Martin Eiliv Sandbu. Fairness and the roads not taken: An experimental test of non-reciprocal set-dependence in distributive preferences
131 -- 155Yeneng Sun, Nicholas C. Yannelis. Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
156 -- 177Gábor Virág. Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders