| 352 | -- | 354 | Yael Maschler. In memory of my father |
| 355 | -- | 360 | Robert J. Aumann. Working with Mike |
| 361 | -- | 362 | Salvador Barberà. Michael Maschler in Barcelona |
| 363 | -- | 0 | Louis J. Billera. The mentor |
| 364 | -- | 0 | Daniel Granot. My referee and collaborator |
| 365 | -- | 366 | Ein-Ya Gura. A mathematics teacher |
| 367 | -- | 0 | Sergiu Hart. Michael's questions |
| 368 | -- | 0 | Hervé Moulin. An advocate of cooperative theory |
| 369 | -- | 0 | Guillermo Owen. Helping young game theorists |
| 370 | -- | 371 | Bezalel Peleg. My joint work with Michael Maschler |
| 372 | -- | 0 | Jos A. M. Potters, Stef Tijs. Michael Maschler in The Netherlands |
| 373 | -- | 0 | Hana Shemesh. Michael Maschler at the Center for the Study of Rationality |
| 374 | -- | 0 | Martin Shubik. In memory of Michael Maschler |
| 375 | -- | 0 | Eilon Solan. Learning from Michael Maschler and working with him |
| 376 | -- | 377 | Marilda Sotomayor. Michael Maschler, a special friend |
| 378 | -- | 379 | Oded Stark. Michael Maschler: My lost migration compass |
| 380 | -- | 0 | Federico Valenciano. Michael Maschler in Bilbao |
| 381 | -- | 0 | Myrna Holtz Wooders. In memory of Michael Maschler |
| 382 | -- | 0 | H. Peyton Young. Michael Maschler, game theory, and the Talmud |
| 383 | -- | 384 | Shmuel Zamir. Teacher, colleague and coauthor |
| 385 | -- | 387 | Shmuel Zamir. Biographical information: Michael B. Maschler |
| 393 | -- | 420 | Steven Callander. Majority rule when voters like to win |
| 421 | -- | 432 | Marco E. Castillo, Philip J. Cross. Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior |
| 433 | -- | 456 | Michela Cella. Informed principal with correlation |
| 457 | -- | 469 | José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier Moses. A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games |
| 470 | -- | 486 | Enrico G. De Giorgi, Stefan Reimann. The α-beauty contest: Choosing numbers, thinking intervals |
| 487 | -- | 513 | Raymond Deneckere, Sergei Severinov. Mechanism design with partial state verifiability |
| 514 | -- | 532 | Alex Dickson, Roger Hartley. The strategic Marshallian cross |
| 533 | -- | 547 | Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken. Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences |
| 548 | -- | 564 | Kjell Hausken. Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow |
| 565 | -- | 590 | Ratul Lahkar, William H. Sandholm. The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games |
| 591 | -- | 611 | Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò. Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences |
| 612 | -- | 631 | Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan. Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions |
| 632 | -- | 649 | Joana Pais. Incentives in decentralized random matching markets |
| 650 | -- | 665 | Maxwell Pak. Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations |
| 666 | -- | 683 | William H. Sandholm, Emin Dokumaci, Ratul Lahkar. The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic |